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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the recent shift toward an anti-tax shelter federal income tax 
compliance norm at public corporations, as evidenced by practitioner and government 
comments and survey results.  The paper focuses on the organizational behavior of tax 
decisionmakers within public corporations as they respond to Sarbanes-Oxley, 
enforcement and publicity initiatives, and tax shelter regulation.  
 
The paper identifies three elements that have contributed to the development of a 
stronger tax compliance norm. First, Sarbanes-Oxley has resulted in the expansion and 
increased transparency of public corporation tax decisionmaking groups. Organizational 
behavior insights suggest that this may produce more considered decisions. Second, civil 
and criminal enforcement and accompanying publicity have resulted in real concerns 
about personal and firm liability among organization leaders. This causes organization 
hierarchies to encourage and reward compliance. Third, the government has clearly 
identified objectionable tax shelter transactions and plainly labeled them unacceptable 
and even fraudulent. In the tax shelter area, this substantially reduces the ethical or legal 
uncertainty that otherwise presents an obstacle to the development of compliance norms 
in organizations.  
 
The paper identifies elements of this story that do not fit neatly under the classic 
economic analysis of tax avoidance or evasion, including the importance of enforcement 
outside the tax context and the particular power of clear government rules.  The paper 
argues that this norm development story could provide a blueprint for regulatory attacks 
on deviant transactions but contends that it offers different lessons for regulatory 
challenges in greyer areas, pointing to a more cooperative approach.  It also sketches the 
challenges of a cost-benefit analysis of such culturally sensitive regulatory strategies. 
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3Introduction 
 
Tax fraud.  Tax shelters.  Aggressive tax planning.  Figuring out the line between 
acceptable and unacceptable activity presents a challenge for every tax decisionmaker, 
and overseeing these choices involves not just substantive tax regulation, but attention to 
the decision-making process.  This Article will review the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, tax and securities enforcement efforts, and tax shelter regulation on 
corporate tax decisionmaking.  It argues, using the example of promoted tax shelters, that 
context and culture, in addition to substantive rules, determine the impact of tax 
regulation on organizations such as large corporations.     
 
Practitioner comments and survey evidence indicate the emergence of a new 
compliance norm at public corporations: 
 
• Compliance (including compliance with tax accounting standards and Sarbanes-
Oxley internal control requirements) has replaced tax planning as the number-one 
project of public corporation tax departments.1
• Tax directors and tax advisors worry more about personal or firm liability2 or 
adverse publicity3 resulting from tax or tax accounting noncompliance. 
1 See Brad L. Brown & James Wolfrom, “SOX 404:  Year Two” at 21 (Nov. 7, 2005) (powerpoint 
presentation for San Jose State University/Tax Executives International Conference, on file with the author) 
(citing KPMG survey results showing financial reporting, Sarbanes-Oxley and tax return compliance as the 
top three priorities and effective tax rate management as the fourth); Tax Council Policy Institute Market 
Research Study at 11 (February 2006) (hereinafter “TCPI 2006 Survey”) (survey results prepared for Tax 
Council Policy Institute conference, on file with the author) (citing avoiding a financial statement error as 
one of the two top priorities for 83% of Fortune 500 tax director respondents and achieving financial 
statement benefit for 50% of respondents). The TCPI 2006 Survey solicited responses from the tax 
directors of the Fortune 500 from December 2005 – January 2006 and received 123 responses. Id. at 4.  The 
questionnaire report states that it has a margin of error of plus or minus 9% at a 95% confidence level.  Id.
at 5. 
2 Employees worry, for example, that they may be scapegoated by employers seeking to avoid criminal 
prosecution at the firm level.  See Memorandum to Heads of Department Components; United States 
Attorneys from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General (Jan. 20, 2003) (available at
www.usdoj.gov) (outlining “principles of federal prosecution of business organizations) [hereinafter 
“Thompson Memo”]; see, e.g., Daniel Fisher & Peter Lattman, “Ratted Out,” Forbes, July 4, 2005, at 49 
(reporting that the Justice Department’s policy of encouraging employer cooperation can result in the 
fingering of employees and the refusal to cooperate in their defense efforts); Letter from Current and 
Former KPMG Board Members and Washington National Tax Partners to Wall Street Journal, New York 
Times et al. (August 10, 2005) (on file with the author) (criticizing KPMG’s decision to save the firm by 
entering into a deferred prosecution agreement, failing to take responsibility for top-level firm decisions 
with respect to the tax shelter business, and firing and refusing to help KPMG partners with legal fees or 
otherwise in connection with defense of civil or criminal litigation) [hereinafter “KPMG Anonymous 
Letter”]. 
3 See, e.g., “Ernst & Young Analyzes Tax Transparency Dynamics,” 2006 TNT 69-10 (Apr. 10, 2006) 
(“Companies are now more concerned than they have ever been about the diminution of their ‘brand value’ 
arising from the disclosure of breakdowns in corporate governance processes, including those related to tax 
transactions.  In an Ernst & Young LLP survey of global tax directors, 70 percent said that ‘reputational 
consequence,’ should a strategy become public, is a very important factor in their tax planning analysis.  
4• Marketing tax shelters to public corporations is no longer big business.4
Most of this Article focuses on a narrow compliance norm:  public corporations’ 
current reluctance to participate in promoted tax shelter transactions.  In Part I, this 
Article describes the typical tax decisionmaking group at a public corporation and 
identifies organizational behavior concepts that help explain the emergence of the 
existing anti-tax shelter norm.   Then, the Article sets forth three elements that have 
contributed to the development of this norm.   
 
First, as discussed in Part II, Sarbanes-Oxley expanded the tax decisionmaking 
group and increased its transparency within the corporate organization. Second, as 
described in Part III, this group is pulled toward a compliance norm by concerns about 
liability at each of the firms to which the group’s members belong.  These liability 
concerns stem from enforcement and publicity efforts in both tax and nontax contexts and 
draw reinforcement from Sarbanes-Oxley financial statement certification and audit 
committee oversight requirements.  Third, as outlined in Part IV, the government has 
clearly labeled certain unacceptable transactions, making it straightforward for a 
compliance-oriented tax decisionmaking group to exclude transactions described in the 
tax shelter regulations, particularly listed transactions, from their planning.  
 
The usual economic analysis would explain these compliance developments by 
framing the tax decisionmaker’s choice as a comparison of (1) the cost of paying tax and 
(2) the difference between the benefit of avoiding the tax and the cost of the imposition of 
tax, interest, and penalties, risk-adjusted for the possibility that the government will 
successfully challenge the tax avoidance strategy and perhaps adjusted for risk aversion 
and reputational loss factors.5
This has translated into a more conservative approach to all tax planning, even when tax planning is related 
to an entirely appropriate business purpose, as it must be.”).  
4 See Robert Goulder, “Current, Former IRS Officials See New Attitude in Corporate Tax Planning,” 2005 
TNT 206-5 (October 25, 2005) (reporting observation of IRS official Deborah Butler of “a more 
conservative approach to strategic tax planning”); Allan Kenney, “Treasury, IRS Officials Discuss Shelter 
Crackdowns, Circular 230 Concerns,” 2005 TNT 125-2 (June 29, 2005) (reporting government officials’ 
praise for progress in “stamping out abusive tax shelters” and their attribution of that progress to 
“stemming shelter promotion”) (citing statements of IRS Commissioner Mark Everson, IRS Chief Counsel 
Donald Korb, and acting Treasury deputy assistant secretary for tax policy Eric Solomon).  Conversations 
with practitioners confirm the observations of these government officials.   See also Rachel Emma 
Silverman, “The Search for a Safe Tax Shelter,” Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 2005 (“Big accounting and law firms 
are being more cautious than in the past, shying away from marketing aggressive shelters, especially those 
designed to generate losses.”).  At least one recent academic article also shifts focus away from the problem 
of tax shelters toward more diffuse tax compliance issues.  See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, “Tax Advice Before 
the Return:  The Case for Raising Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges,” 25 Va. Tax L. Rev. 583,  
586 (2006) (arguing that compliance momentum must expand beyond mass-marketed tax shelters to more 
tailored, but still abusive, tax planning). 
5 See Joel Slemrod, “The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness,” 57 Nat’l Tax J. 877, 881-82 (2004) 
(describing standard model). 
5The economic analysis predicts that increased taxpayer penalties, whether 
enforcement of existing penalties6 or the addition of larger7 or differently-designed8
penalties, will deter tax avoidance by directly increasing its cost.  The economic approach 
also suggests that disclosure will lead to more compliance if it produces more 
enforcement, both generally and specifically with respect to a disclosing taxpayer.9
This Article’s tax compliance norm development story is consistent with the 
rational taxpayer economic model.  Increased enforcement efforts and publicity increased 
the perceived likelihood of discovery and expected size of civil and criminal penalties for 
participation in promoted tax shelters considered abusive by the IRS.  Increased 
government efforts to identify and force disclosure of tax shelters also raised the chance 
of discovery of such transactions.  
 
However, this Article also claims the importance of several elements that do not 
fit neatly into the rational economic taxpayer model.  Part II argues that because tax 
decisionmaking at large corporations is a group exercise, group dynamics amplify 
commonly held views – including compliance tendencies.  Part III contends that 
enforcement efforts wholly unrelated to tax have had a positive impact on tax compliance 
because they produce general liability concerns within organizations, including the 
corporate taxpayer itself and advising accounting firms, to which members of the tax 
decisionmaking group belong.  Part IV emphasizes the importance of the clarity of the 
line drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behavior in the tax shelter area as a 
factor that helps a decisionmaking group avoid ethical uncertainty and reach consensus.  
Part V acknowledges that this observed new norm is narrow. Some anecdotal 
evidence suggests more generally conservative corporate taxpayer behavior, but 
corporations continue to use creative tax planning tools such as hybrid securities and 
offshore tax structures.  Nevertheless, Part V argues that the government can draw on 
organizational behavior insights to encourage compliance outside the promoted tax 
shelter area, although the appropriate approach may differ from the three elements 
contributing to the development of the anti-promoted tax shelter norm.  As examples of 
such culturally-sensitive regulation, Part V points to several IRS initiatives for large 
corporations. 
 
6 See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, “Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters:  The Problem, Possible Solutions, 
and a Reply to Professor Weisbach,” 55 Tax L. Rev. 325, 361 (2002) (noting that taxpayers believe that 
penalties will not be imposed).  
7 See, e.g., Department of the Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters:  Discussion, Analysis and 
Legislative Proposals 109 (July 1999) (hereinafter “1999 Treasury Report”) (calling for a 25% excise tax 
on tax benefits earned from a tax shelter). 
8 See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, “Crime and Punishment in Taxation:  Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty,” 109 Colum. L. Rev. 569, 572-73 (2006) (proposing to calculate penalty as a function of 
related deduction or income item in order to impose a higher penalty for items that are more difficult to 
detect). 
9 See Ronald A. Pearlman, “Demystifying Disclosure:  First Steps,” 55 Tax. L. Rev. 289, 293-94 (2002) 
(listing tax policy, audit and deterrence reasons for requiring disclosure). 
6Part V also states that the observed new norm may be temporary.  It considers 
how the government could encourage more permanent, noncyclical tax compliance 
norms.  Finally, Part V offers a brief consideration of the cost-benefit issues raised by the 
regulatory approaches described in the Article. 
 
I. The Behavior of the Tax Group 
 
A. The Tax Director’s Organization 
 
At a typical public corporation, the tax director has responsibility for making or 
recommending tax decisions.10 Such decisions relate to both planning (for example, 
determining what offshore structure optimizes the corporation’s tax position) and 
financial accounting (for example, calculating the “tax provision,” which is the figure that 
describes the corporation’s exposure to tax audit risk on its financial statements).  This 
tax director might have a vice president or similar title and typically reports to the 
corporation’s CFO. 
 
Depending on the size of the corporation, the tax director’s staff ranges in size 
from two or three to twenty or more.  The tax department generally has responsibility for 
a range of taxes in addition to federal income taxes, including state income, sales and use, 
property, customs and excise, non-US income and non-US value added taxes.  As a 
result, there is often a premium on recruiting staff members with varying kinds of 
expertise, if only to cover routine return-filing tasks.  
 
With respect to the tax planning portion of the tax director’s job, he or she 
typically engages outside accounting, law, or other consulting firms as tax planning 
advisors.  Such experts may serve as ongoing consultants, particularly with respect to 
financial accounting matters.  Or they may advise on a specific project in a complex and 
market-sensitive area, such a corporate acquisition transaction, an offshore intellectual 
property structure, or a transfer pricing plan. 
 
The tax director also receives outside advice with respect to the financial 
accounting portion of his or her job.  For example, the tax director may consult the tax 
experts at the corporation’s financial accounting firm to determine whether a particular 
tax planning exercise will result in a tax benefit asset on the corporation’s balance sheet.  
As another example, each quarter the tax director typically confirms the corporation’s 
calculation of the tax provision estimating its tax audit exposure with the accounting firm. 
 
Historically, the financial accounting firm has often also provided tax consulting 
advice.  Before Sarbanes-Oxley, particularly in the case of marketed tax shelters, such 
consulting advice was cross-sold by accounting firms to their audit clients under 
conditions involving significant conflicts of interest:  the provision of both tax and audit 
advice by the same firm to a client discouraged an independent and critical financial 
 
10 [2004-2005 Tax Executives Institute survey data to provide backup for description of tax director 
organization in this Part III.A.] 
7accounting review of the client’s tax planning.11 As discussed in more detail below, after 
Sarbanes-Oxley, tax directors often separate tax planning and financial accounting, hiring 
independent law firms or other tax planners to provide the former and relying on their 
audit firm for the latter.12 
In addition, after Sarbanes-Oxley, the tax director has another advisor:  the 
Section 404 auditor.  As discussed in Part II.B.2 below, this auditor, who is often from 
the corporation’s financial accounting firm but who has a separate mandate under 
Sarbanes-Oxley, vets the process by which the tax department reaches its decisions in 
order to certify that the process meets applicable “internal controls” requirements.  The 
Section 404 audit also often involves some examination of the substantive correctness of 
tax positions.13 
This Article accordingly examines the development of norms within a typical 
post-Sarbanes-Oxley public corporation tax decisionmaking group anchored by at least 
four tax or accounting specialists:  the tax director, the outside law firm or other tax 
planner, the financial auditor, and the Section 404 auditor.  Each of the four members of 
the tax decisionmaking group also belong to other groups.  Specifically, they hail from 
three different firms:  the tax director from the public corporation; the Section 404 auditor 
and the financial auditor from the corporation’s accounting firm; and the tax planner from 
a law firm, consulting firm, or different accounting firm.  
 
B. The Relevance of an Expanded and More Transparent Group 
As described above, the typical four-member public corporation tax 
decisionmaking group is larger than the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley group for two reasons.  First, 
the public corporation’s financial auditor is less likely to provide tax planning advice.  
Second, the Section 404 auditor has been added to the group. 
 
Some organizational behavior texts consider group size and structure as it relates 
to appropriate work assignments.  They suggest that groups with centralized structures 
are better at reaching quick, correct, simple decisions; groups with decentralized 
structures, where each member of the group talks to the other members, are thought to be 
better at reaching the right decisions in complicated cases.14 A group with a centralized 
“wheel” or “star” structure may have a key decisionmaker at the center and a number of 
individuals feeding information to that decisionmaking person.15 A decentralized or “all 
channel” group is diagrammed as a polygon of some kind; the number of people in the 
 
11 See, e.g., Bernard Wolfman, “The Best Way to Protect Auditor Independence,” 89 Tax Notes 1779 (Dec. 
25, 2000) (noting that conflict of interest can result not only from provision of tax consulting services to an 
audit client, but also from selling a tax product to a non-audit client, since “another tax product huckster” 
might peddle a similar product). 
12 See infra Part II.B.1. 
13 See infra Part II.B.2. 
14 See, e.g., Laurie J. Mullins, Management and Organisational Behavior at 488 ff. (1999). 
15 Id.
8group determine the number of sides and points of the polygon, and each person 
communicates with each other person in the group.16 
The basic insight of the comparison between a “star” group and an “all-channel” 
group is that complex problems benefit from the contribution of a number of different 
viewpoints.  Anyone who has circulated an academic article for review or run a tricky 
situation by a law practice colleague has acted on a similar instinct.  In addition to 
capturing new ideas from a variety of sources, the process of discussion may help the 
participants better focus their mental energies on the problem being discussed – as 
opposed to the many other puzzles their brains constantly face.17 
It is also true that an all-channel group has the potential to increase information 
flow if the members of the group themselves belong to different networks.  A related 
theory considers “structural holes” in organizations.  In the corporate governance context, 
the application of this social capital and economic sociology theory suggests that gaps 
between social networks in a corporation create opportunities for individuals who bridge 
the gaps to control information and thus, results.18 For example, a CEO who is the sole 
bridge between the social network of an independent board and the social network of a 
corporation can benefit greatly from controlling the information the board receives (such 
as compensation information).19 
At least some pre-Sarbanes-Oxley decisions to engage in promoted tax shelters 
were apparently made by the tax shelter promoter and the corporation, without input from 
other advisors.20 In contrast, after Sarbanes-Oxley, the tax decisionmaking group 
contains at least four tax or accounting specialists who bridge three major networks, those 
of the audit firm, the tax planning firm, and the corporate tax department. Each group 
member’s ability to control information for his or her own purposes is accordingly more 
limited.  In addition, the increased internal transparency21 of tax decisions at public 
corporations after Sarbanes-Oxley, attributable in large part to audit committee 
oversight,22 further limits tax decisionmakers’ ability to control information. 
 
16 Id.
17 Cf. Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, “Neuroeconomics and Rationality,” 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1235, 
1248-50 (2005) (describing neurological research indicating that the brain must choose what problems to 
address and how carefully to consider decisions). 
18 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, “Corporate Misbehavior by Elite Decision-Makers Symposium:  Perspectives 
from Law and Social Psychology:  Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies:  The Missing 
Link in Corporate Governance,” 70 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1313, 1323-26 (2005) (summarizing Ronald Burt’s 
theory). 
19 See id. at 1348-1350 (suggesting that independent boards tend to be correlated with strong CEOs). 
20 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 214, 216 (1993) (describing decision involving 
Compaq’s treasurer, assistant treasurer and CFO one day after a one-hour initial meeting with promoters 
from Twenty-First Securities Corporation to enter into a foreign tax credit generation transaction), rev’d,
277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001). 
21 Although “transparency” frequently means visibility of corporate decisions to outside groups such as 
regulators or shareholders, this Article generally uses it to mean internal transparency, or visibility of 
decisions made by small groups within a large organization to the rest of the organization.  
22 See infra Part II.C. 
9C. Group Norm Development 
Even if group members effectively share information to reach more informed, 
better decisions, “better” may not mean “more compliant” decisions, depending on how 
the group defines “better.” Organizational behavior research has examined the 
phenomenon of group norms, or the “informal rules that groups adopt to regulate . . . 
group members’ behavior.”23 Positive and production-encouraging group norms may 
include rules of etiquette (be prompt; don’t interrupt) and performance standards (do the 
work assigned on deadline; be ready to back up conclusions with good data).  They are 
essential to the successful performance of a group.  Conversely, detrimental group norms 
may develop that hinder or block a group’s effectiveness.24 
Group norms also encompass legal and ethical matters such as compliance with 
the law.  A compliance norm may take the form of narrow legal norm or a broader social 
norm.25 These are distinguishable,26 though legal rule changes can prompt changes in 
both.27 A narrow legal norm might produce a monitoring and internal control system 
designed to effect purely rational, economic calculations regarding the cost of 
compliance, likelihood of detection, and level of penalties.28 A social norm constitutes a 
broader agreement that compliance is one of the social or even moral values of the 
organization.29 
Organizational behavior literature suggests that group norms develop within a 
business organization as a result of negotiation between the members of the group, which 
 
23 Daniel C. Feldman, “The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms,” in Management & 
Organizational Behavior Classics 217, 217 (Michael T. Matteson & John M. Ivancevich, eds., 7th ed. 1999). 
24 See, e.g., id. at 218 (distinguishing between group norms that facilitate productive behavior and those 
that discourage it); Hackman & Oldham, [  ], in Classic Readings in Organizational Behavior 251, 257-58 
(J. Steven Ott, ed., 2d ed. 1996) (recommending encouraging groups to develop specific performance-
enhancing norms).   
25 Cf. Barry D. Baysinger, “Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations,” 71 B.U.L. 
Rev. 341, 349-50 (1991) (stating that management influences organizational norm development both 
through direct “indoctrination,” or “strategic controls,” and through the selection of output measurement 
standards for judging work, or “financial controls”); 
26 See Eric Talley, “Disclosure Norms,” 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1955, 1960-61 (2001) (distinguishing between 
legal compliance and extralegal norms, and arguing that the two are complementary). 
27 See, e.g., Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms 33 (2000) (noting that legal changes can amend both 
people’s behavior and their beliefs); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “The Limits of Social Norms,” 74 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 1537, 1544 (2000) (noting that law can produce social norm changes). 
28 See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, “Regulation, Compliance and the Firm,” 76 Temp. L. Rev. 451, 472-73 
(2003) (“[E]vidence of compliance-oriented firm policies and structures is equally consistent with the 
deterrence model.  Even a strictly rational firm would comply with some regulations, and thus would need 
mechanisms to identify the ‘right’ rules with which to comply and to make sure that those obligations are 
met.”).  
29 See Robert Cooter, “Expressive Law and Economics,” 27 J. Leg. Stud. 585, 607 (1998) (“Law provides 
an instrument for changing social norms by expressing commitments.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, “Corporate 
Law and Social Norms,” 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253, 1262-63 (1999) (describing social norms rooted in 
“belief systems”); Cass R. Sunstein, “Social Norms and Social Rules,” 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 914 (1996) 
(attributing “social attitudes of approval and disapproval” to social norms). 
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is heavily influenced by the views of leaders of the organization.30 Group norms may 
differ from individual norms, and in particular may amplify them.31 Professor Cass 
Sunstein has described group members’ tendency to defer to information offered by 
others instead of disclosing their own information, particularly when differing 
information is offered by a peer or supervisor and adverse reputational sanctions might 
result from offering different information.32 Under this view, groups tend to amplify 
information or results offered early in a discussion or by a senior member of the group – 
whether the information or results are good or bad – and arrive at an more extreme 
consensus relative to the individual view initially offered.33 Professor Donald 
Langevoort offers the example of large corporations’ tendency to develop optimism 
biases that lead to overcommitment and overbidding for assets.34 
The same factors cited as reasons for the development of aggressive or risk-taking 
firm norms can also support the development of compliance norms. The dynamic 
Sunstein and Langevoort identify surely exists in public corporation tax decisionmaking 
groups.  But if each member of the group is inclined toward compliance as a result of 
incentives at work at each member’s firm, increased compliance is the amplified 
consensus.  In other words, the group dynamic can work in the regulator’s favor.  
 
Numerous authors have documented the phenomenon of the blurring of individual 
norms within an organization.  Some note that this de-emphasis of individual norms goes 
along with the decrease in personal responsibility for a decision made by a group.35 In 
addition, corporations are hierarchies, and disagreement with one’s superior on ethical (or 
other) matters can cause adverse results ranging from an exclusion from social office 
conversation to the loss of a job.36 Finally, commentators have observed that managers 
 
30 See, e.g., James G. March & Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 99-100 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that 
individual members of work groups can exert pressure on norm development and that disproportionate 
weight may be accorded to norms to which more group members subscribe and norms held by senior group 
members); Feldman, supra note 23, at 223 (stating that statements of superiors or other group members 
affect the development of group norms); Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, “What Are the 
Ways of Achieving Corporate Social Responsibility?:  If I Only Had a Heart:  Or, How Can We Identify a 
Corporate Morality,” 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1645, 1663 (2002) (contending that “individuals are psychologically 
constrained by their corporate roles”).  
31 See Donald C. Langevoort, “Organized Illusions:  A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead 
Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms),” 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 131 (1997) (noting that 
corporations themselves “develop belief systems – shared ways of interpreting themselves, their 
environments, their pasts, and their prospects”) (citing March & Simon, supra note 30, at 160).   
32 See Cass R. Sunstein, “Group Judgments:  Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets,” 80 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 966 (2005) (identifying “informational influences” and “social pressures”). 
33 See id. at 1012-13 (noting “polarization” process and “cascades”). 
34 See id. at 139-40 (stating that business organizations often amplify optimism bias). 
35 See, e.g., Don Welch, Conflicting Agendas:  Personal Morality in Institutional Settings 61 (1994) 
(commenting that the decrease in personal responsibility decreases the tension between individual morality 
and group norms); see also Langevoort, supra note 31, at 138 (noting the particular strength of group 
cohesion when group members share responsibility for a decision). 
36 See Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes 45 (1988) (“For most managers, however, future chances in an 
organization, after the crucial break points in a career are reached, are seen to depend not on competence 
nor on performance as such.  Instead, managers see success depending principally on meeting social criteria 
established by the authority and political alignments – that is, by the fealty and alliance structure – and by 
the ethos and style of the organization.”); John M. Darley, “The Dynamics of Authority Influence in 
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often face uncertain dilemmas, where the ethical path is not clearly distinguishable from 
the ethical path.37 
D. The Relevance of Liability and Enforcement 
The first two factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph -- decreased personal 
responsibility and hierarchy -- make individual ethics in corporations contingent on the 
ethics of the corporation, often as expressed through the views of one’s superiors.  In 
particular, with respect to the four tax or accounting specialists considered in this Article, 
each member – the tax director, tax planner, financial auditor and Section 404 auditor – 
belongs to a firm which provides top-down guidance on the appropriate priority to be 
given to ethical or “compliance” considerations.  This top-down guidance will largely 
determine whether the group defines a “better” decision as a more compliant decision.  
 
The factors of decreased personal responsibility and hierarchy explain the 
importance of recent tax and securities enforcement efforts and practice standard 
revisions.  Part III further discusses these developments.  To the extent that they generate 
real anxiety about personal and firm liability among leaders of corporations, law firms, 
other tax planning firms and accounting firms, the focus at the top on avoiding liability  
should prompt subsidiary decisionmaking groups like the tax group to prioritize 
compliance.38 
This Article in fact observes such an emphasis on compliance, particularly with 
respect to avoiding promoted tax shelters.39 Such a post-Sarbanes-Oxley compliance 
result contrasts sharply with other studies of harmful corporate group dynamics.  
Professor Robert Jackall describes norm development at corporations as an exercise in 
trading more ethical individual norms for less ethical corporate norms.  Jackall reports, 
for example, a whistleblower who lost his job after reporting financial accounting fraud,40 
an engineer who faced suspension after documenting procedural shortcuts in the cleanup 
 
Organizations and the Unintended Action Consequences,” 37, 38, in Social Influences on Ethical Behavior 
in Organizations (John M. Darley, David M. Messick & Tom R. Tyler, eds., 2001) (noting that authority 
hierarchies help to influence individuals to commit acts they otherwise would not). 
37 See, e.g., Baysinger, supra note 25, at 354 (noting the uncertainty of the boundary between legal and 
illegal behavior, especially for less senior employees); Kimberly D. Krawiec, “Cosmetic Compliance and 
the Failure of Negotiated Governance,” 81 Wash. U.L.Q. 487, 542-43 (2003) (arguing that inevitable gaps 
in compliance rules leave room for self-interested groups including regulated corporations and their legal 
advisers to push their own agendas). 
38 Some note, however, that the process by which organizations communicate a top-down desire for 
increased ethics or compliance is complex and imperfect, in part because of the inevitable simultaneous 
focus on measurable output metrics.  See, e.g., Baysinger, supra note 25, at 362-363 (citing NASA’s 
experience with the 1986 Challenger disaster as an example of the difficulty of institutionalizing safety 
norms); Malloy, supra note 28, at 491 (noting that information flow problems interfere with compliance 
efforts). 
39 See supra TAN 1-4. 
40 See Jackall, supra note 36, at 105-11. 
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of the Three Mile Island nuclear site,41 and corporate efforts to conceal respiratory illness 
caused by cotton dust42 and ozone erosion caused by formaldehyde.43 
In a similar vein, Professor Donald Langevoort has written extensively about the 
“groupthink” phenomenon and other cognitive biases within corporations, in an effort to 
explain securities fraud and other harmful activities.44 He argues that corporations suffer 
from “optimism bias” and points out that groups give individuals a strong disincentive to 
“introduce stressful dissonant information into a group setting once the group has 
implicitly agreed to think otherwise.”45 The resulting conformity and dislike for negative 
information encourages groups to make riskier, less conservative decisions than 
individuals would make.46 
Case studies of other business responses to regulation note the tension between 
profit-oriented business norms, which are related to the harmful tendencies identified by 
Jackall and Langevoort, and regulation-responsive compliance norms.  For example, 
Professors Ayres and Braithwaite conclude after examination of a series of case studies 
that business managers can be influenced both by legal compliance norms and profit-
seeking norms.47 They state that in light of these conflicting incentives, both forgiveness 
(for well-meaning firms) and ferocity (for rationally calculating firms) are appropriate 
regulatory tools.48 
The recently developed tax shelter compliance norm in public corporations, 
however, finds support not only in individual managers’ underlying commitment to law-
abiding behavior, but also in the consensus and conformity tendencies identified by 
Jackall and Langevoort as typical factors in the creation of harmful group norms.  In 
particular, all four tax or accounting specialists – tax director, tax planner, Section 404 
auditor and financial auditor – have reason to advocate compliance as a result of 
individual concern about personal liability for aggressive planning.  More critically, the 
interaction of these individuals, each with an independent reason to fear liability, works 
to overcome the tendency to discount the risk of enforcement (optimism bias) and 
 
41 See Jackall, supra note 36, at 112-18.  
42 See Jackall, supra note 36, at 157-5 
43 See Jackall, supra note 36, at 177-78. 
44 See Donald C. Langevoort, “The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering:  Beliefs, Biases and 
Organizational Behavior,” 63 Brooklyn L. Rev. 629, 639-642 (1997) (citing cognitive simplification, 
optimism and commitment as reasons why corporations overlook bad news and underestimate risk); see
Langevoort, supra note 31, at 138-39 (noting that groups’ desire to preserve cohesiveness can explain 
institutional decisionmaking that leaves out important information) (citing Irving Janis, Victims of 
Groupthink 8 (1972)). 
45 See Donald C. Langevoort, “Taking Myths Seriously:  An Essay for Lawyers,” 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 
1569, 1578 (2000) (placing groups’ tendency to think positively in the context of a discussion about the 
importance of myth in organizations). 
46 See also Baysinger, supra note 25, at 353-54 (citing optimism bias as a reason why corporations may 
commit crime). 
47 See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation:  Transcending the Deregulation Debate 21-29 
(1992) (noting a variety of motivations); see also Malloy, supra note 28, at 474-75 (noting evidence of 
compliance norm development within business firms in other regulatory response case studies). 
48 See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 47, at 27. 
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contributes to the development of a compliance consensus and an anti-tax shelter group 
norm. 
 
E. The Relevance of a Clear Government Message 
The third factor noted at the end of Part I.C as a contributing factor to the 
phenomenon of individual norm blurring within an organization is the uncertainty of the 
legal or ethical path.  In a group decisionmaking context, such uncertainty permits other 
goals – such as profit or self-interest – to push the ethical interpretation to its aggressive 
limit.49 In the tax area, ongoing tax shelter controversies amply illustrate the difficulty of 
determining whether a certain tax product is illegal.50 
Moreover, in the area of corporate tax compliance, the clarity of the line between 
acceptable and unacceptable activities is of particular importance.  Despite some 
evidence of conviction that individuals believe that paying taxes is a moral obligation,51 
such an obligation can quickly become obscured, particularly in the corporate context, by 
the complexity of the rules that determine the amount of tax due and uncertainty about 
how the government will interpret and enforce them.52 
Clear rules, as opposed to broad standards, have potential disadvantages, such as a 
tradeoff between extreme complexity and failure to capture similar transactions.53 But in 
the promoted tax shelter context clear rules appear to have achieved good results.  The 
unequivocal government disapproval of promoted tax shelters limits the impact of other 
decision factors and provides a clear course of action that the members of the tax 
decisionmaking group can agree on:  don’t engage in promoted tax shelter transactions, 
especially those that are listed as such.54 
49 See supra note 37. 
50 See infra Part IV.B.1 (describing tax shelter litigation). 
51 See Slemrod, supra note 5, at 883 (noting significant “experimental and empirical evidence” that of 
noneconomic taxpayer motives such as civic duty and trust in the fairness of the tax system); Robert W. 
McGee, “The Ethics of Tax Evasion:  A Survey of International Business Academics,” 25-28 (Feb. 12, 
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (available at www.ssrn.com/ssrn-id803964)
(reporting survey results indicating that business professors believed tax evasion was unethical even where 
government engaged in objectionable or even reprehensible acts); Pew Research Center, “A Barometer of 
Modern Morals: Sex, Drugs and the 1040” 1 (Mar. 28, 2006) (reporting that 79% of survey respondents 
believed that “not reporting all income on your taxes” was morally wrong). 
52 See Slemrod, supra note 5, at 883 (noting that corporations frame the tax compliance question as a matter 
of tax avoidance, or “creative compliance,” not tax evasion); id. at 884 (“To be sure, creative compliance is 
facilitated because the tax law is exceedingly complex and open to alternative interpretations, and this 
undoubtedly facilitates ethical rationalizations of positions taken.”). 
53 See infra TAN 275-276. 
54 See infra Part IV.B.3. 
14
II. How Sarbanes-Oxley Produced an Expanded and More Transparent Tax 
Decisionmaking Group 
A. Sarbanes-Oxley Overview.   
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 55 emerged from a highly charged political 
atmosphere where decisionmakers were motivated to take action by well-publicized 
scandals and a bear stock market.56 Some commentators have pointed out that the 
enactors of Sarbanes-Oxley did not pay much attention to academic empirical evidence 
and theoretical research relating to the likely success of various regulatory approaches.57 
Others have criticized its failure to impose strict liability penalties on, or otherwise raise 
the stakes for, the professionals auditing and advising corporations.58 But the impact of 
Sarbanes-Oxley on the composition and internal transparency of public corporation tax 
decisionmaking groups demonstrates the potential benefits of at least some provisions 
enacted as part of that legislation. 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley includes a new oversight board for the accounting profession; 
various disclosure, audit and governance rules intended to encourage corporate 
responsibility, specific rules to promote director and auditor independence; and 
provisions imposing or increasing criminal penalties for actions including document 
 
55 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 
and 29 U.S.C.). 
56 See Robert W. Hamilton, “The Crisis in Corporate Governance:  2002 Style,” 40 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 45-48 
(2003) (explaining that Republicans hastily dropped their opposition to the already-pending Democratic bill 
in the face of an electorate unhappy about falling stock prices and apparent corporate governance failures); 
Roberta Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,” 114 Yale 
L.J. 1521, 1543-44 (2005) (noting lack of attention to relevant research, pressure on Congress to act on 
corporate fraud in an election year, and weakness of accounting and business lobbies in light of 
contemporaneous scandals such as Enron). 
57 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 56, at 1533-37  (contending that 19 of 25 available empirical studies found 
no link between audit quality and prohibitions on auditor provision of non-audit services); id. at 1540-43 
(stating that two available empirical studies of the value of officer certification of financial statements give 
ambiguous results).  See also Larry E. Ribstein, “Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:  A 
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,” 28 Iowa J. Corp. L. 1, 25, 35-45  (2002) (discussing 
perceived costs of increased regulation). 
58 See John C. Coffee, Jr., “Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:  The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant 
Reforms,” 84 B.U.L. Rev. 301, 349-353 (2004) (proposing better alignment of gatekeeper and shareholder 
incentives through a regulatory strict liability); Patricia A. McCoy, “Realigning Auditors’ Incentives,” 35 
Conn. L. Rev. 989, 1008-1012 (2003) (reviewing the alternate approaches of mandatory audit firm rotation, 
statutory auditors and financial statement insurance); Frank Partnoy, “Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?:  A 
Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime,” 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 491, 540 (2001) (recommending 
contractual strict liability based on portion of issuer damages).  See also Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
“Choosing Gatekeepers:  The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability,” 52 UCLA L. 
Rev. 413, 427-29 (2004) (evaluating financial statement insurance alternative).   Accounting firms often 
include liability caps and arbitration provisions in their engagement agreements.  See Michael Rapoport, 
“Auditing ‘Liability Caps’ Face Fire,”  Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 2005, at C3 (reporting that some investors 
object to the caps). 
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destruction and fraud.59 With few exceptions60 Sarbanes-Oxley does not attempt to 
distinguish substantively between appropriate and inappropriate transactions.  For 
example, the new oversight board, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, or 
PCAOB,61 does not have responsibility for developing substantive rules under generally 
accepted accounting principles, or GAAP.  The Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
or FASB, continues to make GAAP rules after Sarbanes-Oxley.62 
B. Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions That Expand the Tax Decisionmaking Group   
Two Sarbanes-Oxley provisions have produced an expansion in the tax 
decisionmaking group: limitations on non-audit services and internal control 
requirements.63 
1. Non-Audit Services Limitations. 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits an audit firm’s provision of tax services to its client 
without prior approval from the client’s independent audit committee.64 Further, more 
restrictive rules promulgated by the PCAOB flatly prohibit accounting firms from 
providing (and cross-selling) certain kinds of tax services to their audit clients.65 
Specifically, these PCAOB rules forbid the provision of advice related to the 
implementation of any transaction listed as a shelter by the IRS,66 defined as a 
 
59 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn:  Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just 
Might Work),” 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915, 941-42 (summarizing Sarbanes-Oxley threads); Hamilton, supra note 
56, at 56-67 (cataloguing Sarbanes-Oxley provisions). 
60 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(k) (codifying Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (prohibiting issuers from 
extending certain personal loans to executives).  
61 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7217, 7219 (codifying PCAOB provisions from Title I of Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
62 See 15 U.S.C. § 7218 (codifying Section 108 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which permits a private group to 
continue to set accounting standards).  FASB rule projects show the effects of recent events, however.  See, 
e.g., infra Part IV.C (regarding accounting for uncertain tax positions under proposed amendments to FAS 
109). 
63 See David E. Hardesty, “Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance in the Corporate Tax Department,” 2004 STT 229-
3 (Nov. 29, 2004) (analyzing non-audit services rules and Section 404). 
64 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1 (h) and (i) (codifying a portion of Section 201(a) and Section 202 of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act).  Prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, audit firms had divested many consulting units.  See
Cunningham, supra note 59, at 953-954 (commenting on EY’s sale to Cap Gemini, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ sale to IBM, KPMG’s IPO/spin-off and Deloitte’s planned split-off).  These 
spin-offs, however, generally did not involve the separation of tax consulting services from audit 
operations; instead, they focused on other consulting areas such as information technology. 
65 See PCAOB, “Board Adopts Standard on Remediation of Material Weaknesses, Rules on Auditor 
Independence and Tax Services,” July 26, 2005 (finalizing Rules 3521-3524).  See also Emily Davis, “New 
PCAOB Rules Target Tax Shelters,” 2005 TNT 145-5, July 29, 2005. 
66 See PCAOB Rule 3522 (treating an auditor as not independent if it markets, plans or opines with respect 
to any listed transaction as defined in Treasury regulations). 
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confidential transaction by the IRS,67 involving the provision of certain aggressive tax 
advice,68 or provided under a contingent fee arrangement.69 
There is evidence that the restrictions on non-audit services have had real effects 
in the market.  In particular, even before the PCAOB finalized the rule described above, 
one study of public filings suggested that the public corporations had significantly shifted 
their consumption of tax services to advisors other than their auditors.70 One 2005 
survey indicated that 41% of public corporations now prohibit their audit firms from 
providing them with any tax services.71 Another survey indicates that audit firms are 
often prohibited from providing any tax work to their audit clients and, even if they do 
provide some tax work, are typically not the largest tax services provider.72 
Corporations have, then, typically responded to the non-audit services rules by 
adding a tax planning advisor from a different firm to the typical public corporation tax 
decisionmaking group.  Moreover, this shift may be more pronounced with respect to 
more involved tax planning decisions.  The cited data sources do not carefully distinguish 
between routine tax services such as uncontroversial tax return preparation and more 
involved tax planning, such as offshore tax structuring, transfer pricing, state tax 
planning, or tax structuring in connection with a business transaction such as an 
acquisition, joint venture or financing.  But a more pronounced shift for advice in the 
latter, more uncertain or riskier planning categories would be consistent with the PCAOB 
rules, which focus on tax planning as opposed to return preparation. 
 
2. Section 404. 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 requires public corporations to establish, document 
and have audited “internal controls” ensuring accurate financial reporting.73 
Commentators have sharply criticized the higher-than-expected costs of the internal 
 
67 See PCAOB Rule 3522(a) (treating an auditor as not independent if it markets, plans or opines with 
respect to any confidential transaction as defined in Treasury regulation § 1.6011-4(b)(3)). 
68 See PCAOB Rule 3522(b) (treating an auditor as not independent if it markets, plans or opines with 
respect to any transaction recommended by the firm that has a significant purpose of tax avoidance and if 
the transaction is not more likely than permissible under relevant tax law). 
69 See PCAOB Rule 3521 (treating an auditor as not independent if it has any contingent fee arrangement, 
including one relating to tax advice). 
70 See Edward L. Maydew & Douglas A. Shackelford, “The Changing Role of Auditors in Corporate Tax 
Planning,” NBER Working Paper 11504, at 19-20 (June 2005) (finding that the ratio of audit fees to tax 
fees, provided by the same firm, had increased from about 1:1 in 2001 to about 4:1 in 2004).  Although an 
increase in audit fees as a result of internal control and other compliance also influences this data, the 
authors record the same trend for 2003, before companies began to incur Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs.  
See id. The authors also present evidence that tax fees remain strong, although they tend to be earned from 
clients other than audit clients.  See id. at 21-24. 
71 See KPMG LLP, “2005 Tax Department Survey:  Executive Summary” 4 (2005) (on file with the author) 
(reporting results of telephone survey of tax directors at 98 “major US corporations” in June and July 
2005).  
72 See TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1 at 19 (reporting that of 56% of responding tax directors used their 
external audit firm for some tax work but not as the primary tax services provider, while 27% did not use 
their external auditor for any tax work).   
73 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (codifying Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404).   
17
control rule74 and its confusing and overinclusive drafting.75 However, it appears to 
provide some synergies with respect to the regulation of tax planning. 
 
The SEC rules implementing Section 404 call for a “control framework that is 
established by a body or group that has followed due-process requirements, including the 
broad distribution of the framework for public comment.”76 In practice, companies rely 
on the “COSO” internal control framework, compiled by a consortium of accounting 
practice groups.77 The COSO standard is process oriented and elaborate.  It features a 
three-part process including controls (e.g. reviews and reconciliations), information 
capture and communication and monitoring.78 
74 The SEC estimated the costs of internal control compliance at $91,000 per company or $1.24 billion total 
annually.  See Securities and Exchange Comm’n, “Management’s Report on Internal Control Over 
Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports,” 68 Fed. Reg. 
36636, 36657 (June 18, 2003).  But surveys demonstrate that the actual cost is significantly higher, even for 
years subsequent to the initial year of compliance.  See, e.g., Financial Executives International Sarbanes-
Oxley Survey Executive Summary 2 (Mar. 2006) (available at
http://www.fei.org/membersonly/FEI_404_Survey_4_2006.pdf ) (reporting internal and external costs at 
larger accelerated filer companies at $3.8 million each for 2005); David Reilly, “Internal Control Help 
Becomes Less Costly,” Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 2006, at C3 (reporting average internal and external cost for all 
companies as $860,000 according to a survey by the Big Four accounting firms).   
The high cost of internal control compliance has apparently led to going-private transactions.  See
Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, “Going Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis,” USC Center in Law, Economics and Organization Research Paper 
No. C06-5 and USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-10, available at www.ssrn.com, at 56-57 
(reporting empirical finding that the rate of acquisition of small public companies increased in the year 
after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley).  It may also have have discouraged non-U.S. corporations from 
listing shares on U.S. exchanges.  See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera & Andrei Postelnicu, “A Not so Foreign 
Exchange:  China Shuns the West as a Location for its Big Corporate Share Offers,” Financial Times, Nov. 
18, 2005, at 13 (reporting that Chinese companies avoid listing on New York-based stock exchanges in part 
to avoid the burdens of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance).   
In partial response to these concerns, the SEC extended effective date of the Section 404 internal 
control provisions for corporations whose market capitalization is less than $75 million, SEC, 
“Management’s Report on Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in 
Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Companies That Are Not Accelerated Filers, Rel. No,. 33-8618 (Sept. 
22, 2005).  An SEC advisory committee has recommended tailoring Sarbanes-Oxley to small businesses, 
including exempting smaller companies from internal controls requirements.  See generally Final Report of 
the Advisory Committee on Small Public Companies to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 48-
57 (Apr. 23, 2006) (SEC Release 33-8666) [hereinafter “SEC Small Company Advisory Committee 
Report”] (providing recommendations for “scaled” application of Rule  404 to smaller corporations, 
including reduction or elimination of external audit requirements).  The SEC is considering taking such 
actions.  See, e.g., Rebecca Buckman & Kara Scannell, “Do U.S. Regulations Drive Away Start-Ups?,” 
Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 2006, at C5 (reporting SEC officials’ apparent willingness to consider tailoring internal 
control requirements).   
75 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Fixing 404 5 (Nov. 3, 2005) (unpublished  manuscript on file with the author) 
(noting that the internal control statute requires the reporting of control failures that “raise a more than 
remote likelihood of a more than inconsequential misstatement”). 
76 17 CFR 240.13a-15(c) (Exchange Act Rule 15d); 17 CFR 240.15d-15(c) (Exchange Act Rule 15d) 
(containing same language). 
77 See SEC Small Company Advisory Committee Report , supra note 74, at 26-27 (identifying and briefly 
describing COSO standard). 
78 See COSO, “Internal Control – Integrated Framework Executive Summary” (2005) (providing an 
overview of COSO internal control approach).  
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Section 404 auditors search for the tax department’s ability to catch, on a 
quarterly79 or more current basis, law changes; correctly record notoriously elusive 
intercompany transaction data; and document their decisions about reporting transactions 
with memos or opinions from relevant advisors.80 Section 404 auditors describe a testing 
process for tax matters that involves zeroing in on the “key review person” (the besieged 
tax director), asking the person how he or she makes decisions, and then inspecting 
records to ensure that the outlined approach (for example, the reconciliation of book and 
tax numbers, memos that relate to particular transactions, the documentation of 
intercompany transactions such as transfer pricing) is in fact followed.81 In a 2004 
survey, a large majority of responding tax directors reported that “some additional effort” 
or a “major effort” would be required for tax department implementation of Section 
404.82 
A Section 404 review may result in the identification of internal red flag 
“significant deficiencies”83 and/or publicly reported reported “material weaknesses”84 
related to tax.  One source reports that over 200 material weaknesses and 31% of adverse 
internal control opinions were tax-related in 2005.85 According to the chairman of the 
SEC, tax issues are the second most frequent cause of material weaknesses (after revenue 
recognition).86 Another source reports that up to a third of tax directors whose companies 
reported a tax-related material weakness left their jobs.87 Whether or not specific issues 
are identified as problems, the fact that a nonprivileged conversation must occur about 
 
79 The focus on quarterly reporting finds reinforcement in the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement that CEOs and 
CFOs certify quarterly and annual financial reports.  See infra Part II.C. 
80 See Hardesty, supra note 63, TAN 7-21 (outlining Section 404 internal evaluation and external audit 
requirements) 
81 James Wolfrom, Ernst & Young, LLP, Presentation at the SJSU/TEI High Technology Tax Institute 
(Nov. 7, 2005) (explaining the “testing script”). 
82 Tax Council Policy Institute Market Research Study at 7 (February 2004) (hereafter “TCPI 2004 
Survey”) (reporting that 63% of respondents reported that “some additional effort” would be required and 
26% reported that “a major effort” would be necessary).  The TCPI 2004 Survey solicited responses from 
the tax directors of the Fortune 500 from December 2003 – January 2004 and received 125 responses.  Id.
at 3.  The questionnaire report states that it has a margin of error of plus or minus 9% at a 95% confidence 
level.  Id. at 5. 
83 Significant deficiencies are known as “minor blows” in the inevitable accounting firm parlance.  Brad L. 
Brown, KPMG LLP, Presentation at the SJSU/TEI High Technology Tax Institute (Nov. 7, 2005). 
84 Or “major blows.”  Id.
85 See Allen Shoulders, “Practical Approaches to Improving Tax Control Effectiveness,” 2006 TNT 80-37 
(Apr. 18, 2006) (reporting results from Ernst & Young examination of public records and from an Audit 
Analytics study). 
86 See Christopher Cox & Matthew McKenna, “The Corporate Tax Practice:  New Challenges,” TAXES 
49, 49-50 (June 2006). Practitioners report that the most significant tax internal control issues include 
problems in the process for recording the deferred tax asset position or performing book and tax 
reconciliation; staffing shortages, including relating to a failure to “separate the three key functions of 
transaction authorization, transaction recording, and handling of assets,” and errors in accounting for 
unusual or complex transactions or foreign operations.  Shoulders, supra note 85. 
87 Brad L. Brown, KPMG LLP & James Wolfrom, Ernst & Young, LLP, Presentation at the SJSU/TEI 
High Technology Tax Institute (Nov. 7, 2005). 
19
these matters with the Section 404 auditor augments the tax decisionmaking group by one 
and increases the internal transparency of that group’s decisions.88 
C. Other Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions That Increase the Tax Decisionmaking 
Group’s Internal Transparency.  
Other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are designed to ensure review of tax director 
(and other manager) decisions by senior managers and the board.  One such provision 
requires CEOs and CFOs to certify quarterly financial reports.89 An officer who 
knowingly or willfully falsely certifies that a report is fair and materially complete faces 
criminal penalties.90 This quarterly certification requirement has produced sub-
certification practices at some companies, which require managers including the tax 
director to sign certification statements with respect to their areas of responsibility on a 
quarterly basis.91 
Another relevant Sarbanes-Oxley provision is audit committee review of financial 
statements.92 The statute requires an audit committee comprised of independent  
members of the corporation’s Board of Directors.93 This committee is required to collect 
and review reports from the corporation’s auditor regarding “critical accounting policies 
and practices” and possible alternative GAAP-compliant accounting treatments.94 The 
certification and audit committee oversight reinforce the top-down tendency of norm 
development within corporations, which was discussed in Part I, and add a statutorily 
mandated compliance element to that chain of command. 
 
Practitioner observations indicate that these provisions have in fact resulted in 
increased oversight from corporations’ audit committees.95 Tax directors report that 
material or substantive tax items or items that arise in Section 404 audits often receive 
 
88 See infra Part II.D (describing erosion of attorney-client and other privileges).   
89 See 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (codifying Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (requiring quarterly certifications 
as to the correctness and completeness of financial reports and internal controls).   
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (codifying Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (providing criminal penalties 
including fines up to $1,000,000 or imprisonment of up to 10 years). 
91 See TCPI 2004 Survey, supra note 82, at 5 (reporting that 19% of tax director respondents faced 
subcertification requirements and that 78% experienced new information collection procedures). 
92 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(k) (codifying Section 204 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (requiring public corporation 
auditors to make reports to audit committees). 
93 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j1-(m) (codifying Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (requiring an independent audit 
committee and defining independence as requiring no fee relationship or affiliation between a board 
member and the corporation). 
94 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(k). 
95 See, e.g., “Ernst & Young Analyzes Tax Transparency Dynamics,” supra note 3 (“Perhaps the most 
tangible sign of how companies have responded to the new environment is the re-emergence of strong 
oversight and active involvement of public company audit committees in all aspects of financial risk 
management, including tax risk  management.  Audit committees are asking more questions about tax[, 
including] such matter[s] as risk profile, critical accounting policies embedded in tax decisions and the 
status of potential tax controversies.”). 
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specific audit committee review.96 Audit committee reactions may include asking for a 
second opinion or increasing the opinion standard required before approving the 
transaction.   
 
Don Korb, who currently serves as IRS Chief Counsel, had the following 
observation about his pre-government experience in practice with a post-Sarbanes-Oxley 
audit committee:  “Sarbanes-Oxley created the milieu, created the meeting.  Those guys 
[on the audit committee] didn’t know anything about the rule that the IRS put out.  What 
they understood was they better pay attention to what the hell is going on.  So that’s why 
the meeting happened.  And then the professional [Korb] shows up and explains to them 
that even though this [proposed transaction] might work . . . they still faced this risk . . . 
and they made a judgment not to do it.”97 
D. Internal Transparency Begets External Transparency 
 
One result of increased internal control regulation and increased audit committee 
oversight is that financial and Section 404 auditors demand more information about tax 
planning.98 A 2004 PCAOB release further contributes to this development by requiring 
audit documentation that provides the “basis for the auditor’s conclusions concerning 
every relevant financial statement assertion.”99 The leading accountants’ trade group, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, or AICPA, backs this broad standard 
by specifically anticipating auditors’ access to opinions of outside counsel 
“notwithstanding potential concerns regarding attorney-client or other forms of 
privilege.”100 
Disclosure of tax planning advice to auditors and audit committee examination of 
tax planning primarily increases the transparency of tax decisions within the corporation 
and among its advisors.  But there is a broader transparency effect as well, since such 
disclosure waives any attorney-client or accountant-client privilege with respect to such 
 
96 See TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1, at 34 (reporting that audit committee reviewed material tax items in 
82% of cases, substantive tax issues in 63% of cases, and tax elements of Section 404 reports in 59% of 
cases). 
97 Unofficial Transcript Is Available of Forum on Tax Shelters,” 2005 TNT 40-63 (Mar. 2, 2005) (quoting 
Don Korb). 
98 See Sheryl Stratton, “Lawyers Discuss Postshelter Assault on Privilege,” 2005 TNT 71-5 (Apr. 14, 2005) 
(reporting on comments at an ABA teleconference by former IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams, now in 
practice at Shearman & Sterling, who stated that auditors demand more information to support the tax 
provision after Sarbanes-Oxley, and that attorney efforts to resist handing over information in the interest 
of protecting attorney-client privilege did not always succeed); Thomas W. White, “The Growing Tension 
Between Auditors and Lawyers,” Directors Monthly 8, 10 (October 2004) (reporting a “tug-of-war among 
auditors and attorneys” as a result of auditor information and representation requests that significantly 
exceeded the standard requests of the past 30 or so years).  In a 2004 survey, 73% of responding tax 
directors responded that their “level of documented support for tax contingency reserves [had] increased in 
the past two years.” TCPI 2004 Survey, supra note 82 at 10.  A 2006 survey showed that 74% of 
responding tax directors had provided outside counsel tax opinions to  auditors.  TCPI 2006 Survey, supra
note 1 at 23. 
99 PCAOB Release 2004-006 A1-4 (June 9, 2004).   
100 AIPCA, The Standards of Field Work § 9326.22 (2004 ed.). 
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advice101 (although work-product protection may remain in some cases).102 There is no 
accountant-client privilege protecting audit workpapers from disclosure.103 A recently 
added section of the tax code purports to provide a tax practitioner-client privilege that 
provides some protection for tax advice given by accountants.104 However, recent cases 
in the tax shelter context have established a narrow scope for the statutory accountant-
client privilege and indicated that the attorney-client and tax practitioner-client privileges 
often do not apply to tax advice, such as when the advisor acts in a promoter capacity 
rather than a legal advisor capacity105 or when the advisor prepares tax returns.106 
These developments lead many practitioners to believe that their work generally 
will not enjoy any privilege protection.107 One might expect that practitioners would 
avoid putting legal advice in writing as a result of such privilege concerns (and also 
because heightened opinion standards make written advice more expensive).108 Such a 
reluctance to provide written advice might decrease, rather than increase, communication 
 
101 According to the classic Wigmore formulation of the attorney-client, “[w]here legal advice of any kind 
is sought, from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that 
purpose, made in confidence, by the client, are at his instance permanently protected, from disclosure by 
himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived.” 101 See 8 Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 2294 
(McNaughton rev. 1961).  The client may waive the privilege by disclosing it to a third person outside the 
attorney-client relationship, such as an auditor or even the government in a tax return or other filing.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that tax return filing waived 
privilege). 
102 There is no automatic waiver of the work-product privilege in the event of disclosure to a third party 
other than the adversary.  See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461, 464, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (concluding that Martha Stewart’s disclosure to her daughter of her attorney’s communication 
waived the attorney-client privilege but not the work product privilege).  Instead, the availability of the 
work-product doctrine depends on a more general balancing test that considers the strength of the claim 
that the material was developed in anticipation of litigation and the importance of the material to the 
requesting litigant’s case.  See Bernard Wolfman, James P. Holden & Kenneth L. Harris, Standards of Tax 
Practice § 306.4.4.2, at 304 (6th ed. 2004) (describing balancing test). 
103 See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-19 (1984) (noting that prior case law 
confirmed that no accountant-client testimonial privilege existed and reversing the Second Circuit’s 
conclusion that work product privilege could cover auditor workpapers). 
104 See I.R.C. § 7525 (extending “common law protections of confidentiality” in attorney-client privilege 
context to tax practitioners). 
105 See, e.g., Doe #1 v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d.627, ___ (W.D.N.C. 2003) (requiring disclosure 
of client identity in response to IRS summons; no privilege existed between Jenkens & Gilchrist or KPMG 
and clients because Jenkins & Gilchrist and KPMG did not provide individualized tax or legal advice but 
rather marketed identical tax shelter packages). 
106 See United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir.) (Posner, C.J.), reh’g denied (1999), cert. 
denied (2000) (stating in dictum that nothing in Section 7525 “suggests that these nonlawyer practitioners 
are entitled to privilege when they are doing other than lawyers’ work”); United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 
F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that advice relating to tax return preparation provided by 
accountants is not privileged). 
107 See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Lawyers Discuss Postshelter Assault on Privilege, ___ Tax Notes Today ___ 
(Apr. 14, 2005) (reporting comments at an April 13 teleconference sponsored by the ABA); James M. 
Lynch, War of the [Tax] Worlds: Privilege versus Transparency, 82 TAXES 89, TAN 2 (2004).  See also
Bruce Kayle, The Tax Adviser’s Privilege in Transactional Matters:  A Synopsis and a Suggestion, 54 Tax 
Lawyer 509 (2001) (noting that a tax lawyer’s transactional advice may be unprivileged due to disclosure 
to other parties in the negotiation or characterization as business  or accounting advice instead of legal 
advice). 
108 See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing Circular 230 developments). 
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and internal transparency.  But although the reaction of requesting less written advice has 
been observed, it does not clearly prevail.109 Perhaps auditors’ demand for 
documentation still mandates written advice for tax matters with material financial 
accounting consequences. 
 
E. What Causal Effect Does Sarbanes-Oxley Have on Tax Compliance? 
This Article argues that the larger and more visible post-Sarbanes-Oxley tax 
decisionmaking group amplifies the compliance tendencies of each of its members.  
These compliance tendencies depend in part on the possibility of tax-related significant 
deficiencies or material weaknesses under Section 404, which carry adverse reputations 
consequences, including possible loss of employment.110 They also depend on the 
enforcement measures and professional standards described in Part III.  Some of the 
enforcement elements described in Part III (such as Circular 230 enforcement standards) 
directly impact members of the tax decisionmaking group.  Others (such as prominent 
criminal cases lodged against CEOs in connection with accounting scandals) do not 
directly impact such group members.  But they have an indirect effect because of the 
strong influence organization leaders (like CEOS) exert on their subordinates (like tax 
directors).111 
This Article does not offer rigorous empirical proof that Sarbanes-Oxley is a 
necessary piece of this tax shelter compliance puzzle.  Nevertheless, the story of a larger 
and more transparent group that amplifies compliance tendencies fostered by 
enforcement squares with the descriptions given by practitioners and government 
officials.  Current government officials cite Sarbanes-Oxley as a factor that facilitates 
their efforts to increase public companies’ tax compliance.112 Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, 
IRS and Treasury reported frustration with their efforts to crack down on promoted tax 
shelters (although the relevant tax shelter rules were also changed in 2002).113 Larry 
Langdon, the former commissioner of the IRS large and mid-size business division 
(“LMSB”) who is now in private practice, has observed that a strong anti-tax shelter 
 
109 A 2006 survey showed that 76% of responding tax directors had “significantly changed [their] practice 
regarding documenting tax reserves in the last two years” and that 74% had provided outside counsel tax 
opinions to  auditors.  TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1, at 23.  It is not clear from the survey data whether 
they increased or decreased their demand for written advice, however.   The same report noted that of the 
13 tax director respondents who had experienced increased government demand for information and made 
a change as a result, 92% only asked for written advice when absolutely necessary; and that of the 25 tax 
director respondents who had experienced increased government demand for information and not made a 
change as a result, 72% believed that the need for written record was more important than risk of possible 
disclosure of privileged information.  See id. at 29, 30. 
110 See supra note 87 (noting that some tax directors left their jobs after reporting material tax weaknesses). 
111 See supra TAN 30 (noting the importance of leaders’ ethics in forming group ethics). 
112 See Deborah M. Nolan, “LMSB’s Compliance Assurance Program (CAP):  One Year Later,” __ Tax 
Executive 27, 27 (2006) (characterizing Sarbanes-Oxley as a window of opportunity); Interview of Mark 
Everson by Frontline, posted Feb. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/shelter/return.html (“Congress . . . has moved forward
with Sarbanes-Oxley, and boards of directors and professionals are certainly much more reticent to enter
into some of these transactions.”).
113 See infra note 236 and accompanying text (noting frustration with pre-2002 regulations’ effectiveness). 
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norm does not appear in private corporations not subject to Sarbanes-Oxley.114 Finally, 
survey evidence shows that Sarbanes-Oxley compliance requires a significant share of 
tax directors’ energy and time.115 
III. Why Tax Decisionmakers Now Worry About Personal and Firm Liability 
The expanded and more transparent tax decisionmaking group described in Part II 
did not alone foster the development of a tax compliance norm.  The group norm 
development literature discussed in Part I indicates that decreased personal responsibility 
and corporate hierarchy can allow corporate norms to overrule individual norms.116 
Moreover, as described in Part I, corporate norms often display aggressive, risk-taking 
tendencies due to organizational behavior phenomena such as optimism bias.117 Parts I 
and II alone might suggest that groups whose work is transparent within an organization 
may more efficiently experience pressure to develop group norms that favor profit 
seeking (or effective tax rate minimization) over compliance.  This Part III explains the 
reasons for the liability and adverse publicity concerns of the members of the tax 
decisionmaking group and the people they work for, which contribute significantly to the 
compliance-oriented nature of the recently developed group norm.118 
A. Criminal Prosecution and Other Enforcement Efforts Directed at Corporate 
Managers 
Numerous recent enforcement initiatives combine to make corporate executives 
and managers worry about possible personal and firm civil and criminal liability.   Big 
criminal prosecutions and convictions of top corporate managers have recently grown out 
of accounting and securities fraud charges at Adelphia,119 Enron,120 HealthSouth,121 
Tyco122 and Worldcom,123 among others.  Some cases have also involved civil federal 
 
114 See Interview of Larry Langdon by Frontline, posted Feb. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/shelter/return.html (“I think, in large measure, [the tax
shelter problem] has been licked for listed corporations because of Sarbanes-Oxley. I think we still have a
major challenge with wealthy individuals, small companies and private companies, because the lack of
disclosure in those arenas still allows all the things we talked about with regard to promoters selling things
to people and getting away with it.”).
115 See supra notes 1 and 82 and accompanying text (summarizing survey evidence). 
116 See supra Part I.D. 
117 See id.
118 See supra TAN 1 (stating that corporate tax directors now articulate compliance as a higher priority than 
effective tax rate reduction). 
119 See Chad Bray, “Adelphia Ex-Executive Avoids Jail for False Report,” Mar. 4, 2006, at B4 (noting 
conviction of John and Timothy Rigas for diverting funds from Adelphia and misleading investors, their 
respective prison sentences of 20 and 15 years, and pending appeals). 
120 See John R. Emshwiller, Gary McWilliams & Ann Davis, “Lay, Skilling Are Convicted of Fraud,” 
Wall St. J., May 26, 2006, at A1 (reporting jury conviction). 
121 See Chad Terhune, “Ex-Finance Chief at HealthSouth Gets Five Years in Jail,” Wall St. J, Online, Dec. 
10, 2005 (reporting sentence of former HealthSouth CFO William T. Owens with respect to $2.7 billion 
accounting fraud and also noting acquittal of former HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy despite William 
Owens’ testimony against him). 
122 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, “Ex-Chief and Aide Guilty of Looting Millions at Tyco,” N.Y. Times, June 
18, 2005, at A1, C4 (reporting conviction of former CEO L. Dennis Kozlowski and former CFO Mark H. 
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charges and private lawsuits, generating significant monetary penalties.124 Some 
directors have made settlement payments out of their own pockets.125 
Criminal and monetary penalties in these non-tax corporate manager cases have 
particular impact on the corporate hierarchy and culture within which the tax director 
works, because of the strong influence top executives wield over the ethics of their 
subordinate managers and the corporation as a whole.126 Increased IRS audit and 
enforcement activity127 aimed at corporate taxpayers also directly impact the tax director. 
Other measures, discussed below in Part III.B, target gatekeepers such as tax planners 
and auditors.  
 
B. Gatekeeper Liability:  Criminal Enforcement, Civil Liability and Circular 230 
The idea of imposing liability on gatekeepers in an effort to prevent principals 
from engaging in misconduct has enjoyed significant academic attention.128 The precise 
definition of “gatekeeper” is sometimes elusive,129 but in the context of the tax 
decisionmaking group considered by this Article, three of the four members – the tax 
planner, the financial auditor and the Section 404 auditor – qualify as agents who can 
 
Swartz on securities fraud, grand larceny, conspiracy and other charges).   Both Kozlowski and Swartz are 
in prison during their appeals.  See “Guilty, Not Guilty, Mistrial,” Wall St. J. Online, Mar. 20, 2006 
(reporting sentences). 
123 See Almar Latour, Shawn Young & Li Yuan, “Ebbers is Convicted in Massive Fraud,” Wall St. J., Mar. 
16, 2005, at A1 (reporting jury conviction of former Worldcom CEO Bernie Ebbers in connection with $11 
billion accounting fraud and noting guilty plea of former CFO Scott Sullivan as well as Ebbers’ appeal 
plans).  Ebbers received a sentence of 25 years and Sullivan a sentence of five years.  See “Guilty, Not 
Guilty, Mistrial,” Wall St. J. Online, Mar. 20, 2006 (providing a summary of conviction and sentencing 
results for prominent white-collar defendants). 
124 See, e.g., Kara Scannell, “Tyco to Pay $50 Million to Settle SEC Accounting Fraud Charges,” Wall St. 
J., Apr. 18, 2006, at C3 (reporting settlement at SEC and noting that Tyco still faces active shareholder 
litigation including a class-action lawsuit related to accounting fraud).  In some cases where offending 
corporations entered bankruptcy, class-action lawsuits against outside advisors have resulted in settlements.  
See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, “Bank of America Settles Lawsuit Over WorldCom,” N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 
2005 (reporting that Citigroup had agreed to pay $2.65 billion and Bank of America would pay $460.5 
million to settle a class action lawsuit brought by bondholders who alleged that the bankers failed to fulfill 
their duty to investigate WorldCom’s financial condition in connection with offerings of WorldCom 
bonds). 
125 See, e.g., Daniel Akst, “Fining the Directors Misses the Mark,” N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 2005, at Section 3, 
Page 6 (noting Worldcom director payments of $20 million and Enron director payments of $13 million).  
126 See infra TAN 30-38 (discussing top-down ethical influences in large organizations).  
127 See “Statement of Eileen J. O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, Before the Committee 
on Finance, United States Senate Concerning Corporate and Partnership Enforcement Issues,” at 3-4 at 5-8 
(June 13, 2006) available at www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/061306testeo.pdf
(attributing increased Tax Division civil and workload to increased IRS enforcement); “IRS Officials Give 
Report on Audit Currency Efforts,” 2006 TNT 28-4 (Feb. 10, 2006) (noting report that audit currency had 
increased and audit cycle time had decreased).  
128 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 58, 84 B.U.L. Rev. at 308-11 (describing gatekeeper concept and possible 
pitfalls in reliance on gatekeepers); Reinier H. Kraakman, “Gatekeepers:  The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy,” 2 J. L. Econ. & Org. 53 (1986). 
129 See Cunningham, supra note 58, 52 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at n. 6 (2004) (suggesting that gatekeeper label is 
imprecise and not very useful). 
25
“disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers.”130 Recent 
enforcement efforts targeting gatekeepers increase the likelihood that they will do so. 
 
1. Criminal Prosecution of Gatekeepers.   
 
The criminal prosecution of Arthur Andersen on charges of obstruction of justice 
in connection with the government’s investigation of Enron provides one example of this 
phenomenon.  When the jury returned a guilty verdict,131 Andersen imploded.  The 
Supreme Court’s subsequent reversal of the conviction132 came too late to save the 
firm.133 
The Andersen case also apparently deterred the government from mounting 
another criminal prosecution with the power to destroy another large audit firm.  In the 
KPMG tax shelter case, the government’s criminal enforcement efforts consist instead of 
a deferred prosecution agreement with the firm and criminal prosecution of individual 
employees. 
 
KPMG was not alone in developing and marketing tax products in the 1990s, but 
other firms that did so made the decision to settle with the government.134 KPMG 
initially fought back.  However, KPMG’s defense sagged in the face of emerging 
information, including a Senate minority report, about KPMG’s systematic tax product 
development and marketing practices, its strategies to conceal the products’ existence or 
details from the IRS and cavalier dismissal of the likelihood that large penalties could be 
imposed on the firm.135 
The Justice Department believed that the evidence that KPMG had pushed 
fraudulent transactions marked by untrue representations about business purpose and the 
like supported criminal charges against the firm.136 But the parties knew of the market 
risks of ruining KPMG with a criminal indictment; a demise of KPMG would have left 
 
130 Kraakman, supra note 128, 2 J. L. Econ. & Org. at 53 (1986). 
131 See United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 374 F. 3d 281, 302 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming guilty jury 
verdict), rev’d by 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
132 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 125 S. Ct. 2129, 2131-32 (2005) (overruling 
guilty jury verdict on grounds that jury instructions did not properly articulate the knowing intent element 
of the obstruction of justice charge). 
133 See Joseph A. Grundfest, “Over Before It Started,” N.Y. Times, June 14, 2005 (stating that “Andersen 
was destroyed when it was indicted”). 
134 See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, “How an Accounting Firm Went from Resistance to Resignation,” N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 28, 2005 (noting early settlements of Ernst & Young and PricewaterhouseCoopers). 
135 See “U.S. Tax Shelter Industry:  The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals:  Four 
KPMG Case Studies:  FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and SC2,” Minority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., S. 
Prt. 108-34, at 7-16 (2003) (describing KPMG’s development, marketing and concealment of tax products). 
See also Tanina Rostain, “Travails in Tax:  KPMG and the Tax-Shelter Controversy,” __, __ in Legal 
Ethics Stories (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban eds., 2006) (describing disclosures by KPMG 
whistleblower Michael Hamersley). 
136 See Information at 4-5, United States v. KPMG LLP, No. 05 Cr. _____ (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2005) 
(describing elements of fraud including false representations and statements in tax opinion letters). 
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only three US-based global accounting firms.137 Instead, the parties entered into a 
deferred prosecution agreement, which drew heavily from the Justice Department’s 
corporate cooperation blueprint articulated in its 2003 Thompson memo.138 
Under the agreement, KPMG must pay $456 million and the Justice Department 
agreed not to pursue its prosecution of KPMG for criminal fraud and conspiracy 
charges.139 KPMG also agreed to limitations on its tax practice such as heightened 
opinion letter standards and a prohibition on marketing any “pre-packaged tax product” 
or providing any confidential tax services.140 And, importantly, it agreed to “cooperate” 
with the government.  The cooperation agreement, following the Thompson memo 
model, requires waiver of attorney-client privilege and provision of any requested 
information, including information about current and former KPMG partners and 
employees, to the government.141 
Criminal fraud and conspiracy charges were filed and are still pending against 16 
former KPMG partners, one lawyer, and an investment advisor.142 One former KPMG 
partner has pled guilty.143 With respect to the individual criminal charges, the correct 
substantive outcome is unclear, in part because no court has passed on the legality of the 
underlying tax shelters.144 The government responds to this charge by explaining that the 
underlying legality does not matter in light of evidently false representations made by 
KPMG and drafted by KPMG for attestation by its clients.145 But since many of the 
false representations related to the existence of a “real” business transaction, some 
commentators and the defense argue that the representations boil down to a view about 
whether the underlying transaction had enough substance in the first place and that the 
 
137 See John R. Wilke, “KPMG Faces Criminal Case on Tax Shelters,” Wall St. J., June 16, 2005, at A1 
(noting Justice Department aversion to causing the collapse of another accounting firm). 
138 See Thompson Memo, supra note 2, at Part II.A.4 (listing “the corporation’s . . . willingness to 
cooperate in the investigation of its agents” as an element to be considered in determining whether to 
criminally charge a corporation). 
139 See Letter from U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York to Robert S. Bennett 2, 13-17 (Aug. 26, 
2005) [hereinafter “KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement”] (stating that KPMG will pay $456 million 
and that the government will delay and potentially dismiss criminal charges). 
140 See id. at 4-9 (articulating practice restrictions and standards). 
141 See id. at 9-12 (detailing cooperation agreement). 
142 See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, “A Single Trial for 18 Named in Tax Shelters,” N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 2006, 
at C3 (reporting that all 18 defendants would stand trial together in New York in the fall of 2006). 
143 See Lynnley Browning & Colin Moynihan, “A Surprise in Tax Case on KPMG,” N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 
2006 (reporting guilty plea of David Rivkin). 
144 See “KPMG in Wonderland,” Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 2005, at A14 (“The KPMG case attempts to short-
circuit the messy business of proving that a tax shelter is illegal by using the power of the prosecution to 
target the tax advisers directly.  And by cutting them off from the support of their firm through the threat of 
a death-sentence indictment of KPMG itself, the government seems intent on compelling the accused to 
cop a plea or settle the case, and so deny them their day in court.”)  
145 See Lynnley Browning, “Prosecutors Lay Out the Case Against KPMG Defendants,” N.Y. Times, Apr. 
24, 2006, at C2 (stating prosecutors’ argument that shelter description in opinion letters was false and 
noting that prosecutors sidestep the question of whether the transactions would be legitimate if in fact 
carried out in the way described in the opinion letters). 
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question of whether the tax shelters themselves were legal is the only appropriate starting 
point.146 
Even if the individual defendants find vindication on substantive ground, 
however, the pending criminal case against individual KPMG partners has practitioners 
particularly worried because the government approach appears to have weakened 
employers’ willingness to protect their employees.147 In KPMG, the firm insulated itself 
from prosecution by identifying employees as bad apples, withdrawing attorney fee and 
other support from them, and waiving attorney-client privilege.  Practitioners have 
responded with great anxiety to the possibility of being scapegoated.148 This government 
approach may have lost part of its bite:  the judge in the KPMG case ruled that 
government pressure on KPMG to withhold legal support from its former partners 
violated the partners’ constitutional rights to substantive due process and assistance of 
counsel.149 But some commentators speculate that this may simply encourage employers 
to make clear that they will not pay to defend criminal or civil charges brought against 
employees arising out of their employment.150 
2. Monetary Penalties and Civil Litigation. 
 
The criminal prosecution and deferred prosecution agreement described above is 
not the end of the matter for KPMG.  It faces ongoing private party fraud and malpractice 
claims. 151 Proposed settlements amount to hundreds of millions of dollars,152 on top of 
the approximately $450 million that KPMG must pay in connection with its deferred 
prosecution agreement.153 
Several of the other Big Four accounting firms – which include Deloitte & 
Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers -- have also faced stiff 
 
146 See Robert Weisberg & David Mills, “A Very Strange Indictment,” Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 2005, at A16 
(criticizing validity of government’s case). 
147 See, e.g, Fisher & Lattman, supra note 2, at 50 (noting danger of talking to in-house attorneys). 
148 See, e.g., KPMG Anonymous Letter, supra note 2, at 6-9 (noting “random tax partner firings” and 
accusing KPMG leaders of improperly shifting firmwide responsibility to a small number of unfortunate 
individuals).  
149 See United States v. Stein, No. S1 05 Crim 0888 (LAK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42915, at *87 - *94 
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006, as amended July 14, 2006) (concluding that Thompson memorandum 
presumption that payment of fees indicates unwillingness to cooperate interferes with defendants’ right to 
fair trial); id. at *101, *118-19 (concluding that KPMG defendants might reasonably expect legal fee 
assistance from KPMG and that government interference with payment of such fees could violate right to 
counsel). 
150 See Posting of Peter J. Henning to White Collar Crime Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2006/06/kpmgs_aftermath.html#comments (June 
28, 2006) (noting possibility of employers or their insurers explicitly limiting future payment of legal fees). 
151 See Jeff Bailey and Lynnley Browning, “KPMG May Dodge One Bullet Only to Face Another,” N. Y. 
Times, June 21, 2005 (noting pending civil litigation and potential damages of hundreds of millions of 
dollars). 
152 See David Reilly, “KPMG Can’t Shake Lawsuit, as Investors Reject Settlement,” Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 
2006, at C2 (reporting proposed $195 million settlement in a class-action case against KPMG and Sidley 
Austin Brown & Wood, which a number of class members have rejected). 
153 See supra TAN 139. 
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fines or other sanctions such as restrictions on individuals’ ability to practice in recent 
years.  Settlements may arise from shareholder class-action lawsuits154 or SEC 
investigations.155 The charges typically relate to the audit firms’ failure to catch and stop 
accounting irregularities.  These monetary settlements have been described as a recent 
trend, representing a change developing in the last decade or so,156 although firms also 
reached large settlements in the early 1990s with respect to the savings and loan 
debacle.157 Accountants’ apparently escalating anxiety is captured, among other places, 
at a website launched in June 2000, accountingmalpractice.com, which lists emerging 
reasons for increased malpractice exposure and sells tools to reduce it. 
 
3. Circular 230. 
 
The Circular 230 rules158 set forth the standards with which a tax advisor must 
comply in order to be eligible to practice before the IRS by, for example, representing a 
client in an audit situation or filing documents (beyond tax returns) on behalf of a client 
with the IRS.159 The government has amended and updated Circular 230 several times in 
the last several years.160 Circular 230 sets forth threshold requirements for an individual 
to be permitted to practice before the IRS,161 articulates practice standards,162 describes 
reasons for disciplinary action,163 and establishes enforcement mechanisms which may 
lead, for example, to the sanction of prohibition of future practice before the IRS.164 An 
 
154 See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder, “KPMG Units Agree to Pay to Settle Malpractice Suits,” N.Y. Times, Oct. 
8, 2004 (reporting $115 million class action settlement relating to Lernout & Hauspie alleged accounting 
irregularities which would apparently rank just outside the top ten settlements by major accounting firms);  
Joseph B. Treaster, “Ernst & Young Says It Will Pay Millions to Settle a Dispute,” N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 
1999, at A1 (reporting settlement with Cendant shareholders of $335 million).   
155 See Floyd Norris, “Ernst Partners Accept Limits on Audits,” N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 2003, at C1 
(reporting that two Ernst & Young audit partners agreed to a settlement with the SEC, related to failure to 
detect accounting violations at Cendant Corporation, which forbids them from auditing public companies). 
156 See Feder, supra note 154 (“noting that a KPMG settlement “reflects a trend in the last decade in which 
major accounting firms have been drawn into – an paid large sums to get released from – litigation growing 
out of major financial scandals”).  
157 See Alison Leigh Cowan, “Big Law and Auditing Firms to Pay Millions in S.&L. Suit,” N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 31, 1992 (reporting significant settlements from a number of firms in connection private and 
government actions with respect to savings and loan fraud). 
158 Regulations Governing the Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 31 CFR Part 10 [hereinafter 
Circular 230]. 
159 See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at § 105.1.1, at 17-18 (defining practice before the 
IRS). 
160 See Steven R. Schneider, Steven R. Dixon & Mona L. Hymel, “Impact of the New Anti-Tax Shelter 
Rules on Non-Tax Lawyers and Accountants,” 64 Inst. Fed. Tax’n ___, TAN (2006). 
161 See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at § 105.1.2, at 19-22 (describing categories of eligible 
practitioners, including attorneys and CPAs). 
162 See id. at § 105.1.4, at 24-26 (listing practice requirements including due diligence, avoidance of 
conflict of interest absent informed consent, and prohibition against signing a return that contains a position 
that lacks a “realistic possibility of being sustained on the merits unless the position is not frivolous and the 
position is adequately disclosed to the Service”). 
163 See id. at § 105.1.5.1, at 26-28 (listing reasons for disciplinary action including conviction of felony or 
crime involving dishonesty, knowingly providing false information to the government, knowingly or 
recklessly rendering a false tax opinion, or willfully violating any provision of Circular 230). 
164 See Circular 230 § 10.50.  See also Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at § 105.1.5, at 26 
(describing enforcement measures). 
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IRS sanction may further lead to disbarment or revocation of a CPA license to practice, 
and may prevent the sanctioned individual from participating in a partnership with other, 
unsanctioned practitioners.165 
At least two recent developments in Circular 230 have received significant 
practitioner attention.166 The first relates to tax opinions, and provides standards that 
“covered opinions” must meet in order to provide a taxpayer with “reasonable cause” 
protection against penalties.167 One category of covered opinions is particularly broad:  
reliance opinions, which constitute written advice that “concludes at a confidence level of 
at least more likely than not . . . that one or more significant Federal tax issues would be 
resolved in the taxpayer’s favor.”168 However, an opinion that includes a disclaimer 
stating that it may not be used for penalty protection purposes does not count as a covered 
reliance opinion.169 
A practitioner delivering a valid covered opinion must not rely on any factual 
assumptions or representations that he or she should know are unreasonable170 and must 
provide a conclusion as to each significant federal tax issue unless explicit agreement 
regarding a “limited scope opinion” is made with the client.171 These requirements of 
broad investigation of facts and broad analysis of law make covered opinions elaborate 
and expensive exercises.  And the broad definition of reliance opinions has persuaded 
some practitioners that every email communication might be a reliance communication, 
giving rise to a ubiquitous practice of placing Circular 230 disclaimers stating that advice 
may not be used for penalty protection purposes at the bottom of every law firm email, in 
an effort to take the communication out of the “covered opinion” definition.172 
The goal of the ubiquitous disclaimer is to avoid the possibility of Circular 230 
sanctions as a result of a covered opinion that failed to meet the applicable standards.  As 
mentioned above, violations of Circular 230 can lead to loss of the privilege of practicing 
before the IRS or other sanctions.  Related penalties such as inability to partner with 
another, unsanctioned practitioner, loss of state-issued professional licenses, or 
 
165 See id.
166 See generally Bernard Wolfman, James P. Holden & Kenneth L. Harris, Standards of Tax Practice at 2-
21 (Supp. 2006) (providing an overview of Circular 230 amendments) 
167 See Circular 230, § 10.35 (describing “covered opinion” requirements).  Under Section 6664, certain 
penalties applicable to underpayments do not apply if the taxpayer demonstrates that its acted in good faith 
and that there was reasonable cause for its return position.  See IRC §§ 6664(c), (d).  A tax opinion is one 
common way of demonstrating reasonable cause. 
168 Circular 230, § 10.35(4)(i). 
169 See Circular 230, § 10.35(4)(ii) (providing no-penalty-protection carveout from reliance opinion 
definition). 
170 See Circular 230 § 10.35(c)(1) (detailing Circular 230 requirements regarding factual matters). 
171 See Circular 230 § 10.35(c)(3) (detailing requirements regarding evaluation of tax issues). 
172 See Letter from New York State Bar Association to IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson, IRS Chief 
Counsel Donald L. Korb, and Acting Deputy Assistant Treasury (Tax Policy) Eric Solomon 2 (May 1, 
2006) (noting “nearly universal” practice of legending all written communications with a no-penalty-
protection warning).   The same letter notes that the no-penalty-protection warning may be inaccurate, since 
no regulations under § 6664 have been issued to confirm that the requirements of Circular 230 will be 
followed for purposes of imposing penalties on taxpayers (as opposed to enforcing practice standards for 
tax advisors).  See id. at 3. 
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reputational harm can follow from IRS sanctions.  Prior to the current Circular 230 
amendments, general professional ethics rules governed non-tax shelter tax opinions173 
and tax shelter opinions were narrowly defined,174 so that the sanction of losing the 
privilege of practicing before the IRS did directly not tie to opinion standards.  Moreover, 
another revised Circular 230 provision charges the persons responsible for tax practice 
within a firm to ensure that others in the firm comply with Circular 230 rules.175 
The second element of the Circular 230 overhaul that has attracted significant 
attention is the development of a more aggressive and more public enforcement office.  
The former Office of Practice was renamed the Office of Professional Responsibility, or 
OPR, and its staff doubled in size.176 OPR reportedly wants to increase the impact of 
disciplinary procedures, in part by pursuing prominent cases that it hopes can more 
broadly influence practitioner behavior.177 OPR has also taken the controversial step of 
proposing public, not private, disciplinary proceedings when a case reaches the 
administrative law judge stage.178 The proposal has drawn significant practitioner 
criticism because of the perceived in terrorem effect of publicity.179 
Circular 230 is one important reason why one member of the tax decisionmaking 
group – the tax planner – feels an increased incentive to behave in compliance with the 
law.  The perceived broadening of responsibility for investigating a client’s facts and 
relevant law, at least for purposes of penalty protection opinions, and the tougher and 
more public approach of OPR makes practitioners worry more about the possibility of 
enforcement.  Moreover, the provision that establishes supervisory responsibility for tax 
practice heads plants this worry within the context of the firm hierarchy, making it more 
likely that the Circular 230 concerns of a junior associate at a law firm, for example, will 
be reinforced by interactions with the partner who leads the firm’s tax department. 
 
C. Publicity 
 
The media spotlight has shone on scandal in recent years, and this, too, makes tax 
decisionmakers anxious.  Many of the authorities cited in the immediately preceding 
sections are newspaper articles.  Scandal is big news, both general corporate scandal and 
tax-specific scandal.   
 
173 See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at § 503.2.1, at 418 (outlining professional rules). 
174 See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at § 503.4.2.1, at 426 (providing definition of tax 
shelter under prior rules). 
175 See Circular 230 § 10.36(a) (imposing responsibilities on tax practice leader). 
176 See Schneider, Dixon & Hymel, supra note 160, at TAN 98 – 99 (describing new OPR). 
177 See Dennis B. Drapkin, “ABA Tax Section Submits Comments on Disciplinary Procedures of IRS 
Office of Professional Responsibility,” 2005 TNT 236-18, at TAN 7-10  (Dec. 9, 2005) (reporting OPR 
intention to shift its enforcement focus).  
178 See Proposed Circular 230 § 10.72 (proposing open proceedings).    
179 See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, “Transparency at the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility:  A Two-Way 
Street?,” 110 Tax Notes 579, ___ (Feb. 6, 2006) (describing comments of prominent practitioners that open 
proceedings will permit the IRS to ruin a practitioner’s reputation without regard to the validity of the 
charge). 
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A tax planner is always wary of the intrepid Lee Sheppard, of Tax Notes, and her 
colleagues.  But major newspaper reporters of late have been known to undertake detailed 
public record examination in search of a tax shelter story.180 A recent bestseller by New 
York Times reporter David Cay Johnston showcases investigative tax journalism with 
chapters lambasting individual and company tax strategies such as Stanley Works’ 
proposed inversion transaction.181 A recent PBS “Frontline” report on tax shelters also 
raised the issue’s profile.182 
The government plays more than a standby role in this media saga. They issue 
press releases about their pursuit of tax cheats, sometimes based settlement deals with 
taxpayers that include the taxpayer’s waiver of certain confidentiality rights.183 They 
publicize settlement offers about tax strategies whose legality has not yet been 
adjudicated – and then publicize the billions of dollars of revenue that result from the 
settlement offers.184 They publicize the KPMG case, and the details of that firm’s 
deferred prosecution deal.   
 
The perceived increased possibility of adverse media attention has led 
practitioners – including the Big Four accounting firms – to formally note the adverse 
impact that tax planning can have on corporate reputation.185 Ernst & Young describes 
successive trends in tax planning, from cost-cutting in the 1980s to lowering effective tax 
rates in the 1990s to protecting corporate reputation today.186 And conference 
participants buzz anxiously about the possibility of landing on the front page of the Wall 
Street Journal.187 
180 See, e.g., Jonathan Weil, “KPMG Used Its Own Tax Shelter,” Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 2005, at C1 (naming  
KPMG and six other companies as purchasers of a particular product marketed by KPMG).   
181 See David Cay Johnston, Perfectly Legal, 231-252 (2003). 
182 “Frontline:  Tax Me If You Can” (PBS television broadcast [Feb. 19, 2003]) (presenting corporate tax 
shelter expose).  
183 See Statement of Eileen J. O’Connor, supra note 127, at 21 (noting that Justice Department Tax Division 
has begun issuing press releases with respect to civil and criminal cases during her tenure as its head); see, 
e.g., Press Release, IRS Accepts Settlement Offer on Contingent Liability Tax Shelter (Dec. 16, 2004) 
available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=132350,00.html (“Hercules [taxpayer] has further 
agreed to a limited waiver of the taxpayer privacy and anti-disclosure rules in connection with this press 
release.”).  The Hercules settlement followed two prominent government court setbacks in contingent 
liability cases.  See TaxProf Blog, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2004/12/irs_settles_her.html
(Dec. 16, 2004) (noting IRS losses in Black & Decker and Coltec). 
184 See infra TAN 201-202 (describing IRS announcements regarding tax shelter settlement offers). 
185 Martin A. Sullivan, “Economic Analysis – Reputation or Lower Taxes,” Tax Notes, Aug. 29, 2005, at 
981 (reporting on reports put out by each of the Big Four accounting firms and noting that the focus of 
media and government attention is on “‘aggressive’ or ‘socially irresponsible’” but not necessarily tax 
evasive behavior). 
186 Ernst & Young study – “Taxes in the Boardroom – A Discussion Paper.”  
187 E.g. John Brennan presentation at SJSU/TEI High Technology Tax Institute, Nov. 8, 2005.  See also
“Ernst & Young Analyzes Tax Transparency Dynamics,” 2006 TNT 69-10 (Apr. 10, 2006) (“Senior 
management and board members sometimes refer to . . . “The Wall Street Journal” factor.  This is the fear 
of being the subject of media coverage arising from a transaction, including a tax planning transaction, that 
might raise the concerns of stakeholders . . . and inflict damage to corporate reputations and stock prices.”). 
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IV. A Clear Government Message 
In Part II, this Article described the emergence of an expanded and more 
transparent public corporation tax decisionmaking group that amplified its members’ 
compliance tendencies.  In Part III, this Article explained that recent criminal 
enforcement, civil liability, professional standard, and publicity efforts cause members of 
this decisionmaking group to worry more about personal and firm liability.  This Part IV 
provides the final piece to the organizational behavior puzzle of the recent creation of a 
tax compliance norm at public corporations:  the clear government identification of 
acceptable, and unacceptable, activities, particularly in the tax shelter area.  It also 
explores the reaction of public corporation tax decisionmaking groups to a new financial 
accounting standard for uncertain tax positions.  
 
A. The Tax Shelter Problem 
 
In the 1990s, major accounting and other tax advisory firms engaged in 
significant tax shelter development and marketing efforts.  The tax shelter products 
typically involved hypertechnical readings of Code or regulation provisions188 and 
possessed a “cookie-cutter” quality:  promoters could market them to many taxpayers. In 
the late 1990s, media reports described heavily marketed strategies undertaken for tax 
reasons alone, with no real business purpose.189 In 1999, Treasury released a report on 
shelters190 that catalogued the available substantive provisions,191 disclosure and penalty 
requirements,192 and case law doctrines limiting or regulating tax shelters,193 as well as 
describing several types of transactions that made the government hopping mad.  
 
The “son-of-BOSS” loss generation transaction provides an example.  Each of the 
Big Four accounting firms marketed this or a similar transaction between 1997-2000, 
often targeting taxpayers who had just sold corporate stock at a gain.  One variation 
featured the contribution of offsetting positions (purchased for the purpose of engaging in 
the tax shelter transaction) consisting of one position with built-in gain and one position 
with built-in loss to a corporation or partnership. The net economic value of the two 
positions taken together was close to zero; a taxpayer purchased them for the purpose of 
engaging in the transaction at nominal cost.  The loss side of the position typically 
involved a contingent liability or an interest component, which the taxpayer argued 
should not reduce the basis of the corporate stock or partnership interest.  The taxpayer 
 
188 See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at 139 (contrasting recent trend with individual tax 
shelters of the 1970s and 1980s, which made use of tax preferences contemplated by the Code or 
regulations). 
189 See, e.g., Janet Novack & Laura Saunders, “The Hustling of X-Rated Shelters,” Forbes, Dec. 14, 1998, 
at 198, __ (describing practice of aggressively marketing questionable tax products). 
190 See 1999 Treasury Report, supra note 7. 
191 Id. at 35-36 (giving examples of general anti-abuse provisions, specific statutory responses to specific 
tax shelter problems, and statutory grants of broad regulatory authority). 
192 Id. at 58-76 (reviewing tax shelter registration and other requirements from the 1980s effort against 
personal tax shelters and a 1997 law strengthening penalties applicable to corporate tax shelters). 
193 Id. at 46-58 (outlining substance-over-form, step transaction, business purpose and economic substance 
doctrines). 
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took the position that the basis of the stock or partnership interest increased by the high 
basis of the built-in gain position, but did not decrease by the full amount of the loss 
position, based on a technical reading of Section 752 (in the case of a partnership interest) 
or Section 358 (in the case of corporate stock).  Then the taxpayer sold the stock or 
partnership interest, with its high basis, for its true, lower economic value, and claimed a 
loss. 194 
Promoters aggressively marketed tax shelter products.  In one instance, a shelter 
appropriate for S corporation shareholders was marketed through a telemarketing firm 
that cold-called owners of S corporations throughout the country.195 Another marketing 
technique, appropriate for public corporation tax directors, involved the cross-selling of 
tax product services by audit partners who arranged meetings between the tax directors at 
their audit clients and the tax consultants at the audit firm.  The tax consultants could 
propose products precisely tailored to the needs of the corporate client, since those needs 
were well-known by the audit team.196 
At its peak in the late 1990s tax product work may have represented as much as 
10% of some accounting firms’ global revenues and as much as 25% of US revenues.197 
It also resulted in significant losses to the U.S. fisc.  Tax shelter revenue loss measures 
are notoriously difficult to estimate, 198 but most attempts indicate at least $10 billion 
annually during the late 1990s.199 IRS estimated tax losses at up to $85 billion from 
listed and nonlisted transactions as of September 30, 2003.200 The results of tax shelter 
settlement offers made by the IRS also give some idea of the magnitude of the losses.  
The son-of-BOSS 2004 settlement offer attracted 1200 taxpayers and generated $3.7 
billion in taxes, interest and penalties.201 A settlement offer covering numerous other 
 
194 See Notice 2000-44, 2000 CB 255; Joseph Bankman, “The Tax Shelter Problem,” 57  N’tl Tax J. 925, 
926-27 (2004) (describing son-of-BOSS shelter).   
195 See S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 34, 39-40 (describing KPMG telemarketing center and its use in marketing 
SC2 shelter).  
196 See id. at 36-38 (describing cooperation between tax product and audit teams in designing and 
marketing products). 
197 See id. at 11-12 (reporting KPMG worldwide revenue of $10.7 billion and KPMG US revenue of $4 
billion in 2002 and peak annual tax shelter revenue of $1.2 billion). 
198 The difference between book and tax income is frequently used as an accessible but imperfect measure 
of corporate tax shelter activity.  See, e.g. Desai.  However, one recent study was unable to confirm the 
existence or growth of tax sheltering activity based on an examination of book and tax income.  See Gil B. 
Manzon, Jr. & George A. Plesko, “The Relation Between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of 
Income,” 55 Tax L. Rev. 175, 177 (2002). 
199 See Slemrod, supra note 5, at 880 & n. 9 (citing IRS contractor estimate of $14.8 – 18.4 billion in 1999 
and Professor Bankman’s 1999 estimate of $10 billion for abusive shelters targeted at corporations and 
wealthy individuals).  This amount is material, though not overwhelming, in the context of the estimated 
$350 billion annual tax gap.  See “IRS Announces Results of Study on Tax Gap,” 2005 TNT 60-5 (Mar. 
29, 2005) (noting that National Research Program study indicated a tax gap of $312 to $353 billion in 2001 
and that most of the tax gap derives from underreporting by self-employed individuals and small 
businesses). 
200 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Challenges Remain in Combating Abusive Tax Shelters 11 (2003) 
[hereinafter GAO 2003 Report] (providing data and noting that potential tax loss amounts do not consider 
reductions that might result during examination and appeal). 
201 See “IRS Announces Success of Taxpayer Settlement Initiatives,” 2005 TNT 132-7 (July 12, 2005). 
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shelters, which closed in January 2005, attracted an estimated 2000 taxpayers and 
generated an estimated $2 billion.202 
Costs other than direct revenue loss also result from tax shelter activity.203 They 
include wasted time and money in the form of uneconomic tax planning and resulting 
enforcement efforts,204 increased complexity as a result of statutory response to perceived 
abuse,205 and the degeneration of the voluntary compliance that underlies the U.S. income 
tax system (aside from wage withholding) in the first place. With respect to the last point, 
sociologists have noted the phenomenon of taxpayers drawing on and copying each 
others’ normative decisions, commenting that the “right” decision from a taxpayer’s 
perspective depends on context, as evidenced by empirical data suggesting that compliant 
taxpayers believe that other taxpayers also comply, while noncompliant taxpayers believe 
that other taxpayers also engage in fraud.206 
B. Drawing the Tax Shelter Line 
Having identified corporate tax shelters as a problem, the government faced the 
task of how to attack them.   When Treasury’s 1999 white paper emerged, regulations 
such as the requirement to register certain confidential corporate transactions with “a 
significant purpose of tax avoidance” already existed, though they (evidently) did not 
stem the corporate tax shelter tide.207 More recently, and contemporaneously with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley and enforcement developments described in Parts III and IV, the 
government has used two principal tools to define the line between acceptable business 
tax planning and tax shelters.  The first tool is litigation.  The second tool is disclosure 
regulations. 
 
1. Litigation.  
 
202 See “Global Settlement Offer May Net 2000 Taxpayers, $2 Billion, Everson Says,” 2006 TNT 59-1 
(Mar. 27, 2006) (reporting on results of settlement offered in Announcement 2006-80, 2005-46 I.R.B.  
967). 
203 See 1999 Treasury Report, supra note 190, at iv. 
204 Some go so far as to assert that nearly all tax planning is worthless.  See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, “Ten 
Truths About Tax Shelters,” 55 Tax L. Rev. 215, 222-225 (2002) (asserting that tax planning is a negative 
externality although acknowledging that planning to avoid taxpayer-adverse mistakes in the law may have 
value). 
205 See James S. Eustice, “Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters:  Old “Brine” in New Bottles,” 55 Tax L. Rev. 
135, 161-62 (2002) (arguing that legislation often generates more problems than it solves). 
206 See, e.g., John S. Carroll, “How Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and Values,” in Why 
People Pay Taxes:  Tax Compliance and Enforcement 43, 47 (Joel Slemrod, ed., 1992). 
207 See I.R.C. § 6111(d) (requiring registration of a transaction with a significant purpose of avoidance or 
evasion of federal income tax by a corporation, where the transaction is offered under conditions of 
confidentiality and the promoter may receive a fee that exceeds $100,000).  See also Wolfman, Holden & 
Harris, supra note 102, at 137–40 (describing the history of tax shelters, including the episode of 
aggressively marketed individual tax products in the 1970s and 1980s); id. at 149-59 (outlining 1994 law 
change that raised the opinion standard for corporate tax shelters for purposes of the substantial 
understatement penalty in Section 6664(c) and the 1997 change requiring registration of certain 
confidential transactions in Section 6111(d)). 
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The government has generally challenged alleged tax shelter transactions with 
substance-over-form arguments. That is, the government claims that such transactions’ 
form should not be respected because they lack economic substance or business 
purpose.208 A full survey of recent corporate tax shelter cases is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  However, the section below outlines several of the more prominent cases and 
attempts to give the mixed-results flavor of the litigation. 
 
The government scored an early win in ACM Partnership, in which the Tax Court 
disallowed partnership losses disproportionately allocated to Colgate Palmolive under a 
scheme involving a product marketed by Merrill Lynch, a tax-indifferent partner, and a 
technical interpretation of the contingent payment installment sale rules.209 The ACM
court focused in the lack of an economic profit that exceeded transaction costs in 
reaching its conclusion that the transaction lacked economic substance, but failed to 
provide much detail regarding that standard, including how much profit would be enough 
or whether the economic substance and business purpose tests were independent.210 The 
Third Circuit affirmed.211 
Since ACM, the government has scored several trial and appellate victories.  The 
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Tax Court in Winn-Dixie that the taxpayer could not 
deduct interest derived from the corporation’s borrowing against life insurance policies it 
owned on the lives of its employees, agreeing that the program lacked economic 
substance where the paid interest and fees exceeded the policies’ expected return and also 
finding no business purpose.212 The Second Circuit upheld an unusual 40% gross 
valuation misstatement penalty assessed against Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) with respect to a loss-generation partnership transaction that was based in part 
on the false representation of LTCM that it had a valid business purpose for the 
transaction.213 The Fourth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment 
for the taxpayer in Black & Decker, concluding that court had to hear expert witnesses 
and consider more carefully the IRS argument that the taxpayer lacked an objective profit 
motive.214 And in Coltec, the Federal Circuit, reversing the Court of Claims, concluded 
 
208 See Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 184, 209 (1983) (indicating that a transaction should be 
respected as valid if it either has business purpose or “possesses some modicum of economic substance”), 
aff’d, 752 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1985).  See also Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at 169-171 
(noting subjective business purpose element and objective profit motive elements of economic substance 
inquiry).     
209 See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M (CCH) 2189 (1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 157 F.3d 231 
(3d Cir. 1988). 
210 See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at 177-78 (analyzing ACM). 
211 See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 263 (affirming disallowance of noneconomic losses) (3d 
Cir. 1998), aff’g in part and rev’g in part 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997). 
212 See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting unchallenged 
finding that program could not generate a pre-tax profit and that program lacked any real business motive), 
aff’g 113 T.C. 254 (1999). 
213 See Long-Term Capital Holdings, LP v. United States, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 20988 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 
2005) (per curiam), aff’g 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004). 
214 See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 440-43 (2006) (noting that Black & Decker 
had stipulated for purposes of summary judgment that the transaction was tax-motivated and criticizing the 
district court’s failure to thoroughly consider IRS evidence tending to show lack of an objective profit 
motive), aff’g in part and rev’g in part 340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 2004).  But see Karen C. Burke, 
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that a contingent liability transaction lacked economic substance, rejecting the taxpayer’s 
claim that assigning contingent asbestos liabilities to a different subsidiary had business 
purpose.215 
However, some of the government’s trial court victories have been reversed by 
appellate courts.  Two cases involving a taxpayer’s participation in a marketed and 
prepackaged foreign tax credit product demonstrate the difficulty of deciding on a metric 
to use in computing pre-tax profit.  In Compaq and IES, the purchase of non-U.S. 
corporate stock (in the form of American Depositary Receipts, or ADRs) immediately 
before the dividend record date and the sale of the same stock immediately after the 
dividend record date generated offsetting dividend income and capital loss and a bonus 
foreign tax credit.216 The lower courts concluded, after treating the foreign tax as an 
expense, that there was not economic profit.217 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits concluded 
that a measure of pre-tax profit should not treat foreign tax as an expense, and reversed 
the Tax Court.218 Another case reveals courts’ reluctance to disregard transactions with 
unrelated third parties.  In UPS, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court in respecting 
the taxpayer’s transfer of its excess value insurance business to a related Bermuda 
corporation through a reinsurance agreement with an unrelated firm.219 
This mixed case law does not draw a clear line between acceptable and 
unacceptable transactions.  Indeed, courts appear to disagree on the appropriate legal 
standard: the cases fail to explain whether a transaction must possess both business 
purpose and an objective profit motive in order to be sustained.220 Legislation clarifying 
the economic substance standard is sometimes proposed.221 But prominent commentators 
 
“Black & Decker in the Fourth Circuit:  Tax Shelters and Textualism,” 111 Tax Notes 315, Pt. IV (Apr. 17, 
2006) (noting that, despite pro-government economic substance decision, Fourth Circuit’s textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation of Section 357 ignored secondary sources and might encourage rigid 
technical readings of statutes by tax shelter designers).  
215 See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, No. 05-5111, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 17351 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 
2006), at *45-*54,  vacating and remanding 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004) (discussing economic substance issue). 
216 See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at 183 (describing transaction). 
217 See Compaq Computer Corp., supra note 20, 113 T.C. at 223-25 (concluding that transaction lacked 
economic substance or business purpose); IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 2001-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH)  ¶ 
50,470, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22610 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (finding a sham transaction because of the lack of 
any change in the taxpayer’s economic position), rev’d by 253 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 2001). 
218 See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 784-87 (5th Cir. 2001) (eliminating foreign tax 
expense from profit calculation and using resulting pre-tax profit as evidence of economic substance and 
business purpose), rev’g 113 T.C. 214 (1999); IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 354-56 
(8th Cir. 2001) (reaching similar result), rev’g 2001-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH)  ¶ 50,470, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
22610 (N.D. Iowa 1999).   
219 See United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018-20 (emphasizing participation of 
unrelated firm and comparing UPS transaction to form-of-entity or debt-versus-equity tax-influenced 
business decisions) (11th Cir. 2001), rev’g 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262 (1999). 
220 See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 102, at 180 (noting that “courts continue to struggle with 
whether a transaction needs to possess both a bona fide non-tax business purpose and a reasonable 
expectation of pre-tax profit to be sustained).  See also Joseph Bankman, “The Economic Substance 
Doctrine,” 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 5, 29 (2000) (noting the complexity and uncertainty of the economic 
substance doctrine). 
221 See, e.g. H.R. 4297, ___ Cong. ___ Sess., at §§ 411-13 (“clarifying” economic substance and providing 
penalties for transactions without it) (passed by the Senate Feb. 2, 2006).  See also Lee Sheppard, “News 
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criticize this approach, arguing that the limits of statutory drafting would result in an 
inferior doctrine.222 The government also no longer advocates economic substance 
codification.223 Treasury and the IRS have concentrated their regulatory energies instead 
on articulating, enforcing, and using information from a tax shelter “web of 
disclosure.”224 
2. Defining Tax Shelters:  The Academic Debate 
 
In parallel with its litigation efforts, Treasury and the IRS embarked in 2000 on a 
regulatory assault on tax shelters that ultimately attempted to clearly identify 
unacceptable tax shelters and prevent taxpayers from engaging in them.  The effort to 
define tax shelters reveals the complex schizophrenia of U.S. federal income tax law, 
under which some provisions of law are nicely consistent with the theory of a realization-
based income tax and others are unabashed tax expenditures.  Even if one can say that the 
tax shelter rules aim at taxpayers who take wacky positions under rules grounded (or 
which the government believes are grounded) in sensible income tax policy, it is often 
hard to tell which group a rule belongs to.   
 
Some commentators contend that a tax shelter definition should diligently avoid 
encompassing transactions that have any business element.225 Another description 
focuses on the objective economic substance of a transaction and considers transactions 
illegitimate if economic losses (or gains) do not accompany tax losses (or gains) of 
similar magnitude.226 Some commentators focus on legislative intent, rather than 
business or tax motive;227 others would simply err on the side of overinclusiveness.228 
Another approach is to list the common features of tax shelters.  This method 
borrows from the tax motivated, economic substance and legislative intent concepts while 
 
Analysis:  Economic Substance Update,” 110 Tax Notes 1137 (Mar. 13, 2006) (noting that the provision, 
scored as a $15  million revenue raiser, was expected to be deleted in conference). 
222 See, e.g., Eustice, supra note 205, at 164-65 (stating that the economic substance doctrine is better left 
to the courts); Bernard Wolfman, “Why Economic Substance is Better Left Uncodified,” 104 Tax Notes 
445 (July 26, 2004) (“There is no shortcut.”).  See also Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, 105 
Colum. L. Rev. 1939, 1952-53 (2005) (arguing for disallowance of loss in excess of measurable net worth 
decrease but not for codification of the economic substance doctrine).  
223 See, e.g., “Senators Scrutinize ‘Peddlers’ of Abusive Tax Shelters,” 2003 TNT 204-1 (Oct. 22, 2003) 
(noting administration’s opposition to codification of economic substance because of increased uncertainty 
and burdens on IRS rulemaking process) (reporting comments of Pamela Olson, assistant secretary for tax 
policy, at hearing before Senate Finance Committee).  
224 See “Treasury Official Discusses Reportable Transactions, Disclosure Requirements, 2003 TNT 215-5 
(Nov. 5, 2003) (noting comments of Eric Solomon describing a tax shelter policy based on a “web of 
disclosure”).  
225 See, e.g., David P. Hariton, “Commentary:  Response to ‘Old ‘Brine’ in New Bottles’ (New Brine in 
Old Bottles),” 55 Tax L. Rev. 397, 400 (2002) (proposing a narrow definition of a tax shelter a transaction 
that “would not have been entered into at all but for the desire to claim tax benefits”). 
226 See Eustice, supra note 205, at 155-56 (describing engineered Cottage Savings swap transaction as 
legitimate because the accelerated loss was a real economic loss). 
227 See Schler, supra note 6, 55 Tax L. Rev. at 331 (outlining definition). 
228 See Pearlman, supra note 9, 55 Tax. L. Rev. at 290 (proposing a definition for purposes of disclosure of 
a transaction “if there is any possibility that the action does not comply with current law”). 
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bringing them down to a more practical level.  Professor Bankman’s 1999 list included 
items such as providing a tax loss with little risk of economic loss (an economic 
substance concept); the presence of a tax-indifferent party (which suggests that the tax-
concerned party will be able to fulfill its tax-motivated strategy without pushback); and 
the presence of a flaw in the tax system that mismatches economic and tax income (a 
factor relating to legislative intent).229 Professor Eustice proposes a similar list, adding 
the absence of economic profit prospects or business purpose.230 
Bankman and Eustice also include factors relating to the marketing or promotion 
of tax shelters in their lists of characteristics, suggesting that “prepackaged” 
transactions231 and transactions suitable for use by more than one taxpayer232 are more 
likely to be tax shelters.  These factors follow from the insight that tax strategies that 
develop independently of a taxpayer’s particular business situation more likely lack 
business purpose or economic substance.  Bankman also lists the following factor:  “the 
shelter is likely to be shut down by legislative or administrative change soon after it is 
detected.”233 The government acted definitively on this most pragmatic factor through its 
disclosure regulations, discussed below.  And, particularly with respect to listed 
transactions, tax regulators gave great weight to promotion and marketing as a business 
purpose proxy. 
 
3. The Web of Disclosure 
 
The government first proposed tax shelter regulations in response to the recent 
wave or corporate tax shelter activity in February 2000.234 Its initial attempt featured a 
broad definition of tax shelter transactions and (due to a lack of Congressional action)235 
no penalties for nondisclosure.  The regulations were not as effective as the government 
had hoped.236 After several rounds of amendment, drafters arrived at a clearer and more 
specific approach.  The government also established the dedicated Office of Tax Shelter 
Analysis to identify and shut down tax shelter transactions.  
 
Today, taxpayer disclosure requirements and material advisor reporting and list 
maintenance obligations target five categories of transactions: (1) listed transactions, 
which are specific transactions described by the IRS in quick-and-dirty Notices designed 
to shut down the transaction fast without elaborate regulatory process; (2) transactions 
 
229 See Joseph Bankman, “The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters,” Tax Notes, June 21, 1999, at 1775, 
_____ (paragraph [7]). 
230 See Eustice, supra note 205, at 158-59. 
231 See Eustice, supra note 205, at 159. 
232 See Bankman, supra note 229, at ___. 
233 Bankman, supra note 229, at ___. 
234 See T.D. 8877, __ Fed. Reg. __ (Feb. 28, 2000) (proposing corporate tax shelter disclosure regulations); 
Announcement 2000-12, 2000-12 I.R.B. 1 (Feb. 29, 2000) (summarizing regulations). 
235 Tax shelter disclosure and penalty provisions made it into a Senate Finance Committee discussion draft 
in 2000, see Ryan J. Donmoyer & Heidi Glenn, “Finance Antishelter ‘Draft’ Boosts Penalties, Standards of 
Conduct,” 1999 TNT 233-2 (Dec. 6, 1999), but did not appear in final legislation. 
236 See Larry R. Langdon, “Langdon Testimony at Finance Committee Hearing on Tax Shelters,” 2002 
TNT 56-20 (Mar. 22, 2002) (providing testimony of IRS official Langdon that promoters interpreted the 
rules narrowly and inadequate disclosure resulted).   
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with large tax losses; (3) confidential transactions; (4) transactions that contractually 
require the return of an adviser’s fee if the desired tax outcome does not result; and (5) 
transactions with brief asset holding periods.237 Under a 2004 statute, specific penalties 
apply for nondisclosure.238 In addition, the government has established a policy of 
requesting all audit workpapers from any taxpayer who has engaged in an undisclosed 
listed transaction, echoing the Thompson memo’s emphasis on cooperation to remedy 
misbehavior.239 
The government’s practice of discovering abusive transactions through a focused 
tax shelter office and labeling transactions tax shelters by “listing” them through 
immediately-effective Notices is central to its disclosure strategy under these revised 
regulations. Notices have identified about 30 transactions as shelters.240 For example, 
Notice practice tarred each of the tax shelters described above in Part V.B.1 despite the 
fact that courts are still considering the validity of some of them.  Listed transactions are 
typically marketed and promoted products, and the government’s focus on promotion as a 
litmus test for abusive tax shelters is public information.241 
The government’s strategy of specifically labeling promoted tax shelter 
transactions as deviant behavior has apparently effectively translated into an anti-tax 
 
237 See I.R.C. § 6111 (requiring material advisor reporting); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(b)(1) (requiring 
taxpayer disclosure); 1.6112-1(b)(2) (requiring material advisor list maintenance).  The list initially 
included transactions with significant book-tax differences.  That category has been removed as a result of 
the development of a new and comprehensive Schedule M-3 describing book-tax differences on corporate 
tax returns, which lays out book-tax differences for corporate tax returns in more detail.   See Notice 2006-
6, 2006-5 I.R.B. 385. 
238 See I.R.C. §§ 6707A (imposing on taxpayers nondisclosure penalties of $200,000 ($100,000 for 
individuals) for listed transactions and $50,000 ($10,000 for individuals) for other reportable transactions 
and requiring disclosure of certain penalties in SEC report); 6707 (imposing on material advisors failure-to-
report penalties of $200,000 or 50-75% of the gross income the material adviser received with respect to a 
listed transaction, $50,000 for other reportable transactions); 6708 (imposing on material advisors penalties 
for failure to maintain or supply investor lists).  See also I.R.C. §§ 6662A (imposing nonwaivable 30% 
penalty for an undisclosed listed transaction or reportable transaction with a significant tax avoidance 
purpose); 6700 (imposing a penalty on promoters of 50% of the gross income derived by the promoter from 
certain transactions).  Other sanctions also follow from nondisclosure of reportable transactions.  See 
generally Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 166, at 25-33 (summarizing penalties relating to tax 
shelters). 
239 See Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72 (announcing that IRS would request all workpapers if a 
taxpayer engaged in a listed transaction and failed to disclose it, and would request workpapers relating to 
any disclosed listed transaction).  This changed a historically restrained IRS policy.  See id. However, it 
has long been clear that the IRS can enforce summons of audit workpapers.  See Arthur Young & Co.,
supra note 103, 465 U.S. at 816-21 (requiring auditors to produce workpapers in response to IRS 
summons).  See also I.R.C. § 7525(b) (providing that communications relating to transactions with a 
significant purpose of federal income tax avoidance or evasion do not enjoy the tax practitioner-client 
statutory privilege) (crossreferencing I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)). 
240 See Notice 2004-67, 2004-41 I.R.B. 600 (providing 30 listed transactions posted as of October 12, 
2004).  The current list is posted on the IRS website at 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html.
241 See GAO 2003 Report, supra note 200, at 4, 7 (stating that IRS uses promoter investigations to identify 
shelters and uses investor information to identify promoters).  See also “Unofficial Transcript Is Available 
of Forum on Tax Shelters,” supra note 4 (“I think the key aspect of technical tax shelters is marketing.) 
(quoting Eric Solomon). 
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shelter compliance norm.  Government officials say taxpayers have simply stopped 
engaging in the development or use of such promoted tax shelter products.242 Perhaps 
government officials say this without adequate evidence in order to enhance others’ view 
of their performance or increase taxpayer compliance by conveying the impression that 
most taxpayers comply.243 But this approach would conflict with IRS and Treasury 
incentives to support additional budget requests.   
 
In addition, other available information corroborates the government officials’ 
view.  For example, former government officials agree with it.244 Practitioners 
informally report that they do not currently observe the promoting and marketing of tax 
shelter products to public corporations.  And one firm, KPMG, has explicitly agreed not 
to ever develop or market “prepackaged tax products” again and to have an internal 
monitor verify its compliance with this (and other) requirements for at least three 
years.245 
Organizational behavior learning identifies ethical uncertainty as a factor that 
causes large organization norms to veer toward aggressive behavior.246 This suggests 
that the clarity of the tax shelter rules, particularly the listed transaction rules, has 
contributed significantly to their success.  Although numerous other factors affect a 
regulator’s choice between rules and standards, this example suggests a reason to 
consider rules very seriously where the regulated party is a large organization.  Perhaps 
the case is even stronger where, as in the tax shelter case, a relatively clear litmus test 
(promotion) is available and the regime is a disclosure regime, not an automatic liability 
regime. 
 
C. New FASB Tax Benefit Accounting Standard 
FASB’s revisions to the standard for recording tax benefits for financial 
accounting purposes provide another example of the responsiveness of public corporation 
tax decisionmaking groups to revised, stricter rules. Under the longstanding standard, 
such benefits were denied for financial accounting purposes only if it was probable that 
they would be successfully asserted by the government.247 Under a standard proposed in 
 
242 See supra note 4 (summarizing government officials’ view that tax shelters are no longer widely 
promoted to large corporations).  This view is corroborated by remarks of prior government officials now 
in private practice.   
243 See, e.g., Interview of Carl Levin by Frontline, posted Feb. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/shelter/return.html (reporting interview with 
Democratic Senator from Michigan) (“That’s obviously an opinion which anyone who defends the status 
quo is going to give – that things have changed.  I don’t buy it at all.”). 
244 See, e.g., Interview of Pamela Olson by Frontline, posted Feb. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/shelter/return.html (“[I] think that the firms are
sufficiently concerned about the reputational damage of being in this tax shelter business. There is much
less of an impetus for them to do it on a going forward basis.”).
245 See KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 139, at 5, 19, 21-22. 
246 See supra Part II.E. 
247 See FAS 109,  ¶¶ 8 and 17(e) (providing that tax assets are reduced by a valuation allowance if it is 
more likely than not that some of the tax assets will not be realized, such as because of expected future net 
operating losses); FAS 5 (requiring the recording of loss contingencies (such as the possibility of increased 
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July 2005, such liabilities would have been recorded unless it is probable that, assuming 
they are asserted by the government, the government would lose.248 The proposal drew 
significant criticism from commentators who noted that it might result in accounting 
inaccuracies, in particular over-reporting of liabilities or under-reporting of assets.249 
Commentators expected some softening and extension of the effective date of the 
proposal.250 Nevertheless, the pending proposal caused some auditors to require a higher 
level of assurance than before for the recording of a future tax benefit – i.e. a “should” 
opinion rather than a “more likely than not” opinion – before it was finalized.251 
FASB has since softened the standard to permit the recording of future tax 
benefits if it is “more likely than not” that, assuming they are asserted by the government, 
the government would lose.252 This standard, still tougher than the longstanding tax 
benefit accounting standard, also has a clear effect in public corporation tax departments.  
Tax director surveys show that such groups are devoting significant energy to compliance 
with the new standard.253 
V. Norm Development and Tax Policy 
This cultural story of the development of an anti-tax shelter norm raises several 
broader points.  First, it provides a framework to consider whether a broader compliance 
norm, extending beyond promoted tax shelters, might develop.   Second, it provokes the 
question of how either a narrow anti-tax shelter norm or a broader compliance norm 
could achieve permanence.  Third, it raises the issue of regulatory cost-benefit analysis. 
 
taxes on audit) if it is “probable” that the liability exists).  See also James R. Browne, “Financial Reporting 
for Uncertain Tax Positions,” 109 Tax Notes 77, TAN 7-33 (Oct. 3, 2005) (explaining current standards). 
248 See FASB Exposure Draft No. 1215-001, “Accounting for Uncertain Tax Positions – an Interpretation 
of FASB Statement No. 109 (July 14, 2005); Browne, supra note 247, at TAN 34-38 (explaining proposed 
standard). 
249 See, e.g., Browne, supra note 247, TAN 57-59 (stating that longstanding standard more accurately 
reports tax assets and liabilities). 
250 See “FASB to Delay Implementation of Uncertain Tax Position Guidance Until 2006, Says SEC 
Official,” 2005 TNT 214-2 (Nov. 4, 2005) (reporting comments of Brian Bullard that FASB planned to 
relax proposed standard and postpone its implementation).  The original effective date of the last quarter of 
2005 was eventually pushed back a year to the first year beginning after December 15, 2006.  See Sirena J. 
Scales, “FASB Agrees on New Effective Date for Guidance on Uncertain Tax Positions,” 2006 TNT 8-2 
(Jan. 12, 2006).  At least some tax directors expected the pushback.  See id.
251 See, e.g., Ken Gee & Rob Terpening, Presentation at San Jose State University/Tax Executives Institute 
High Technology Tax Institute, in Palo Alto, CA (Nov. 8, 2005) (commenting that different auditors have 
different standards and that some have tightened their standard as a result of the proposed changes to FAS 
109).  See also KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 139, at 7 (accepting a heightened 
opinion standard).  One survey also reports that financial statement disclosure relating to uncertain tax 
positions has increased.  See TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1 at 18 (reporting that 63% of respondents 
report such disclosure has increased in the past two years). 
252 See FASB Interpretation No. 48 at 12 (June 2006), available at http://www.fasb.org.pdf.fin%2048.pdf. 
(outlining more-likely-than-not standard).  
253 See, e.g., TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1, at 37 (reporting that 41% of respondents cited FAS 109 
compliance as the top tax group challenge). 
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A. How to Promote a Broader Norm. 
1. The Existing Narrow Norm. 
 
The new tax compliance norm described in this paper is narrow:  the demise of 
promoted tax shelters.  The question of whether a broader conservatism has developed 
remains open.  Some developments, such as accounting firms’ adherence to the stricter 
FASB rules in advance of their finalization or effective date,254 point to a broader 
tendency to give more conservative advice.  In addition, there are anecdotal reports of 
somewhat more conservative planning behaviors apart from the avoidance of listed 
transactions.  For example, firms doing offshore tax planning may expect their Section 
404 auditor and their financial auditor to push back at the margins, demanding larger 
payments in exchange for the transfer of existing technology overseas, suggesting 
adjustments to transfer prices so they are slightly less favorable to the corporation, 
requiring completed paperwork documenting intercompany agreements and checking to 
ensure that those written agreements are followed more carefully in practice. 
 
But it goes too far to say that the tax shelter and Sarbanes-Oxley exercise has 
generated a broader social norm of conservative corporate taxpaying behavior.255 One 
major area of continued big-ticket tax planning shifts income to lower-tax offshore 
locations.256 Another involves the use of hybrid securities treated as interest-generating 
debt for tax purposes and equity for other regulatory purposes.257 Tax planners continue 
to pursue patents for some tax-reduction ideas, a pattern that suggests some of the same 
lack-of-business-purpose problems as tax shelter promotion.258 Tax decisionmakers may 
rely on unclear IRS guidance to reach aggressive conclusions in these areas,259 while top 
IRS officials identify them as current compliance challenges.260 
254 See infra Part IV.C. 
255 Cf. Kirsten A. Cook, G. Ryan Huston & Thomas C. Omer, “Earnings Management Through Effective 
Tax rates:  The Effects of Tax Planning Investment and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002” at 2 (June 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at www.ssrn.com) (summarizing empirical study result that effective 
tax rate management is still observed post-Sarbanes-Oxley, although less so for firms that do not purchase 
tax services from their auditors). 
256 See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, “Governments and Multinational Corporations in the Race to 
the Bottom,” ___ Tax Notes Int’l 459, 460-62 (Feb. 6, 2006) (noting declines in effective tax rates from 
1992 to 2002 due to offshore planning and identifying tax reduction strategies including those involving 
hybrid securities and hybrid entities) (also forthcoming in Florida Tax Review).  See also Lee Sheppard, 
“Check-the-Box Rules Not Sacred, Says Hicks,” 2006 TNT 107-8 (June 2, 2006) (noting that “the Big Four 
accounting firms are thought to have already complied playbooks of CFC look-through gambits” in 
response to Section 954(c)(6), a look-through rule which permits certain related-party income to be treated 
as active, non-subpart F income). 
257 See, e.g., Ivar Simensen, “Appeal of Hybrid Bonds Has Bankers Chasing ‘Holy Grail,’” Fin. Times, at 
__ (Feb. 8, 2006) (reporting issuances of hybrid instruments).  
258 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., “Background and Issues Relating to the Patenting of 
Tax Advice” 22-23 (Comm. Print. 2006) (noting that the patent process may encourage the development of 
marketable products by providing protection against duplication of a patented structure without any 
requirement of disclosure under the tax shelter regulations absent a contractual requirement of 
confidentiality). 
259 See, e.g., Preamble to Prop. Reg. 1.482-7, __ Fed. Reg. ___ (Aug. 22, 2005), available at 2005 TNT 
162-1, Part A (describing the proposed “investor model” concept for arriving at arm’s length prices for 
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2. The Carrot and the Stick 
 
So how should the government build on the success of its campaign against 
promoted tax shelters to increase taxpayer compliance in other areas?  The direct 
prescription, based on the case study discussed in this Article, might read as follows:  
further expand the internal transparency and size of the tax decisionmaking group, 
aggressively pursue enforcement programs that affect each member of the group, and 
clearly label deviant transactions in non-tax shelter areas.  That is what appears to have 
worked for tax shelters; why shouldn’t it work for offshore planning and financing 
transactions and other current areas of compliance concern?   
 
IRS and Treasury leaders have spoken out regularly and thoughtfully on issues of 
compliance and enforcement in recent years.  They have notably not focused exclusively 
on hard-nosed enforcement and scarlet-letter listing tactics.  Instead, they emphasize 
service as well as enforcement.261 According to the head of LMSB, the large-corporation 
division of the IRS, the government’s goal is to reach out to good-faith taxpayers and 
build efficient working relationships marked by trust and cooperation, while cracking 
down insistently on bad-faith taxpayers.262 Academics such as Professor Dan Kahan 
have also endorsed this idea of different regulatory approaches depending on the 
cooperation offered by regulated parties.263 
This Article’s story about the development of a narrow tax shelter compliance 
norm is a story about a stick, not a carrot (with some nuance; for example, the tax shelter 
settlement programs offered might fit the carrot mold).  It clearly offers a useful model 
 
intangibles transfers, which would attribute greater value to IP generated by US parent corporations 
because it would attach value to those corporations’ “external contributions”).  Rev. Rul. 2003-97, 2003-34 
I.R.B. 380 (permitting separate treatment of debt and equity components of certain collateralized forward 
contracts, resulting in an interest deduction for issuer).  See also Lee Sheppard, “News Analysis:  Is 
Apportionment the Formula for Intangible Development?,”108 Tax Notes 1093 (Sept. 5, 2005) (criticizing 
confusing state of existing and proposed transfer pricing regulations and recommending a formulary 
apportionment approach); Lee Sheppard, “News Analysis:  Having it Both Ways on Feline PRIDES,” 2005 
TNT 25-4 (Feb. 3, 2005)  (alleging that Rev. Rul. 2003-97 does not reconcile with I.R.C. Section 163(l), 
which prohibits an interest deduction for interest payable in equity).  
260 See, e.g., “Written Testimony of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson Before Senate 
Committee on Finance on Compliance Concerns Relative to Large and Mid-Size Businesses” at 5-8 (June 
13, 2006) available at www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/061306testme.pdf (listing 
intangibles transfers, cost sharing, and transfer pricing and abusive foreign tax credit, hybrid instrument or 
entity transactions as major global compliance concerns). 
261 See, e.g., “IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson Statement on 2005 Enforcement and Service Results,” 
1005 TNT 213-10 (Nov. 3, 2005) (emphasizing goals of service, modernization and enforcement and 
reporting enforcement results). 
262 Telephone Interview with Deborah M. Nolan, Commissioner, IRS Large and Mid-Size Business 
Division (June 23, 2006). 
263 See Dan M. Kahan, “The Logic of Reciprocity:  Trust, Collective Action, and Law,” 102 Mich. L. Rev. 
71, 83-84 (2003) (suggesting that governments should encourage the reciprocal compliance behavior by 
emphasizing other taxpayers’ compliance rather than the possibility of audit, but should also punish 
“dedicated cheaters”).  See also Tranter, Evasion in Taxation (1929); Braithwaite, ed., Taxing Democracy:  
Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion (2003).  
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for other situations in which the IRS wishes to clamp down on deviant transactions.  In 
particular, the story demonstrates the power of a group to reinforce compliance norms if 
all members of the group have ample incentive to comply.  This in turn suggests the 
importance of enforcement on all fronts – with respect to tax directors, their superiors 
within corporate organizations and their advisors, for example.  And the story shows the 
particular power of clear rules to promote compliance in a group norm situation.   
 
One area where this approach may again prove effective is in the effort to stop tax 
protesters, who claim constitutional rights and currently face several well-publicized 
enforcement efforts.  This is not a large organization issue, and some of the behavioral 
patterns discussed in this Article may consequently be muted.  Nevertheless, individuals 
in society are also susceptible to the development of group norms, and the basic 
framework should be applicable.  In the tax protester situation, the government has 
established a clear rule by summarily rejecting constitutional and other blanket arguments 
supporting nonpayment of federal income taxes.264 It has also tried to pursue 
enforcement actions against both advisers and taxpayers, which may have a 
disproportionately strong effect on compliance by influencing more than one element of 
an individual’s tax decisionmaking group.265 
Other current compliance issues are more grey than black-and-white.  Take cost-
sharing and offshore intellectual property transfers.  The typical plan in this case for a 
U.S. parent company involves locating valuable intellectual property (or “IP”) in a low-
tax offshore subsidiary and directing offshore profits to that IP holding company.  One 
piece of this strategy involves structuring intercompany payments among offshore 
subsidiaries to avoid pitfalls in subpart F, which taxes a U.S. parent corporation on 
certain passive or mobile income of its non-U.S. subsidiaries.266 The other piece, a more 
prominent current compliance target, involves the placement of intellectual property in 
the IP holding company.267 The U.S. parent taxpayer benefits if it can sell its existing IP 
to the IP holding company at a low price and charge the IP holding company low future 
“cost-sharing” payments for the non-US interest in future IP, because it will recognize 
less gain or income and will still wholly control the IP.268 
Recent proposed regulations attempt to address the problem of underpricing 
intellectual property sent offshore by introducing the “investor model” concept to force 
taxpayers to more fully recognize the value of the U.S. parent corporation’s contribution 
 
264 See Statement of Eileen J. O’Connor, supra note 127, at 16 (listing such “tax fraud” schemes). 
265 See id. at 16 – 17 (summarizing recent cases against promoters and taxpayers). 
266 See Stephen E. Shay, “Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F,” __ Taxes 29, 31-33 (Mar. 2004) (providing 
an example of “plain-vanilla subpart F planning”). 
267 See id. at 32 (noting the usual recommendation to transfer income-generating intangibles to a low-taxed 
foreign subsidiary using an arm’s length “buy-in” payment for existing intangibles and a cost-sharing 
arrangement for future intangibles). 
268 See Keith Reams et al., “Proposed Cost-Sharing Regulations:  Are They a Realistic Alternative?,” 109 
Tax Notes 239, at TAN 6-7 (Oct. 10, 2005) (noting IRS concern that taxpayers systematically undervalued 
buy-in payments and failed to enter into cost-sharing arrangements like those that unrelated parties would 
enter into). 
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to the development of the IP when setting these prices.269 And recent enforcement efforts 
have alleged that some firms have stepped over the line with respect to their intellectual 
property valuations or cost-sharing methodology.270 Is the government attempting to 
develop a hard-nosed approach that labels aggressive IP pricing for offshore transfers 
deviant and bad, just as it labeled promoted tax shelters deviant and bad? 
 
The government would be ill-advised to do so; its stakeholders do not show signs 
of willingness to accept such a label of deviance. The offshore IP transfer situation is 
grey factually, because it depends (under current law) on a facts-and-circumstances 
valuation exercise.  It is grey from a policy perspective, if one believes that U.S. parent 
corporations may invest in non-U.S. subsidiaries. And enforcement efforts to tar certain 
aggressive taxpayers have not produced government success.  In particular, the Tax 
Court271 and other nations’ tax authorities,272 seem to think the issues are grey. 
 
3. Lessons for Grey Areas. 
 
If the lessons of this Article’s tax shelter norm development story are relatively 
clear for deviant transactions, like the tax protester case, they are more subtle for grey 
areas, like offshore IP planning.   
 
Consider first enforcement.  As Professor Kahan points out, some empirical 
evidence suggests that broad-based enforcement can lead taxpayers to believe that 
noncompliance is widespread, thus encouraging them to cheat more.273 Enforcement, he 
argues, is better aimed at determined tax cheats than at taxpayers prepared to make a 
good effort at compliance.274 This view of enforcement suggests in grey areas, where it 
believes that there are good taxpayers as well as bad taxpayers, the government should 
separate good from bad, and adopt different strategies for each.  
 
Next consider the value of clear rules. The success of clear regulations aimed at 
tax shelter promoters is not always transferable, because many transactions are not 
“clearly deviant” but rather fall into a grey area.  The literature on the efficiency of rules 
vs. standards demonstrates that clear rules are not always an appropriate solution, due to 
factors such as possibly suffocating complexity275 and ease of avoidance.276 
269 See Preamble to Prop. Reg. 1.482-7, supra note 259. 
270 See, e.g., Xilinx Inc. v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 37, 52-53 (2005) (upholding that taxpayer’s omission of 
stock option costs from allocated costs under its transfer pricing agreement); “Glaxo Sees Global Scrutiny 
for Transfer Pricing of Popular Drugs,” BNA Daily Tax Report, at J-1 (Apr. 19, 2004) (noting U.S. 
assertion that too little value was attributed to U.S. marketing intangibles and too much profit was 
attributed to UK parent of GlaxoSmithKline).  The Glaxo litigation is still underway. 
271 See Xilinx, 125 T.C. at 52-53 (holding for the taxpayer). 
272 See Glaxo Sees Global Scrutiny, supra note 270 (noting that UK Inland Revenue “supported Glaxo’s 
position that no additional taxes were due to the IRS”). 
273 See Kahan, supra note 263, at 82-83 (attributing phenomenon to “social cueing”). 
274 See id. at 84 (stating that enforcement is appropriate for “dedicated cheaters”). 
275 See David A. Weisbach, “Costs of Departures from Formalism:  Formalism in the Tax Law,” 66 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 860, 867-69 (1999) (arguing that rules are systematically more complex than standards, particularly 
in the tax area where rules that overlook uncommon similar transactions may drive taxpayers to engage in 
those overlooked transactions). 
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Commentators also persuasively argue that not all regulatory situations are 
susceptible of rules.  For example, some situations are too dependent on endlessly 
varying facts and circumstances,277 or do not permit a rule that closes off close 
substitutions to taxpayer planning.278 These problems may be somewhat muted in the 
case of tax shelter regulation, because its status as a disclosure regime may mean that 
overinclusiveness does not carry any direct liability for appropriate transactions.279 
Clear rules’ ability to relatively smoothly translate into organizational norms 
constitutes a factor in favor of rules instead of standards in the large corporation context.  
But there remain many areas where standards, not rules, are the right approach.  In these 
cases, the recognition that standards’ vagueness presents a challenge for the development 
of a large organization compliance norm should prompt the government to call in 
different strategies to help organizations draw responsible lines. 
 
Finally, consider the expanded and more transparent tax decisionmaking group at 
public corporations.  If a more cooperative, non-enforcement strategy is appropriate for 
good-faith taxpayers, and if some situations require standards-based regulation under 
which organizations must draw lines, how should the government think about the 
instrumental large-corporation tax decisionmaking group?  The smart regulatory route 
would harness the potential strength of the group in some way, just as the multifaceted 
enforcement and clear rule combination harnessed its strength and amplified the 
compliance tendencies of its members in the case of promoted tax shelters.   
 
Some proposals to encourage compliance in areas beyond the marketed tax shelter 
arena rely on gatekeeper policing and try to increase the visibility and reputational costs 
of bad advice.  For example, Professor Linda Beale has recently made just such a 
proposal to improve tax practitioners’ compliance ethic.  She suggests raising the 
standard for a return filing position to more-likely-than-not and removing attorney-client 
privilege protection for pre-filing advice.280 
Tax regulators have pursued some efforts to improve gatekeeper ethics, most 
notably the amendments to Circular 230.281 But they have also more directly tried to 
influence large corporations’ tax decisionmaking process.  Several recent initiatives rely 
on more, and earlier, direct communication between the government and the tax 
decisionmakers at large corporations.  The programs try to select good-faith corporate 
taxpayers and put a government representative in direct communication with tax 
 
276 See David M. Schizer, “Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning,” 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1312, 1323-26 
(2001) (arguing that the success of a tax rule depends in large part on the nature of the “friction” a taxpayer 
will experience in an effort to avoid it). 
277 Distinguishing between debt and equity provides a classic tax example. 
278 See Schizer, supra note 276, at 1324 (noting that the difficulty of avoiding a rule must be significant and 
inflexible for the rule to be effective). 
279 See Pearlman, supra note 9, at 303 (arguing for a broad tax shelter disclosure standard). 
280 See Beale, supra note 4, at 638 (summarizing proposal).  
281 See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing Circular 230). 
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decisionmakers at the tax decisionmaking stage.282 The issues subject to resolution 
include grey areas such as the offshore IP transfer example discussed above. 
 
The flagship “real time audit”283 or “CAP” program targets certain large 
corporations284 and involves an agreement executed by the government and the taxpayer, 
which identifies the goals of the CAP relationship.285 In almost all cases, top 
management signs off on the IRS presence.286 In its pilot year, 17 large corporations 
accepted IRS invitations to participate in CAP.287 The CAP program anticipates 
“extensive cooperation between the Service and participating taxpayers;”288 its goal is to 
resolve all material issues before the filing of a return, in which case the IRS pledges that 
it will not audit the return filed in accordance with the agreement.289 
The CAP early issue resolution program is a conscious government effort to take 
advantage of the compliance-oriented environment that currently prevails inside public 
corporations, including expanded and more transparent tax decisionmaking groups.290 It 
is consistent with an organizational behavior insight: a tax group that invites the IRS to 
participate in its decisionmaking is more likely to develop and sustain strong tax 
compliance norms.  This creative approach has achieved preliminary success291 and 
deserves continued support.   
 
The CAP program and similar initiatives differ radically in tone and approach 
from the disclose-and-settle-or-we’ll-get-you tax shelter regulatory approach.  CAP’s 
approach is a carrot.  The head of LMSB describes it as a mutually beneficial trade of 
transparency for certainty within the context of a cooperative regulatory relationship.292 
282 See Cliff Jernigan, Corporate Tax Audit Survival:  A View of the IRS Through Corporate Insider Eyes
71-78 (2005) (describing pre-filing agreements regarding factual issues, industry issue resolution 
agreements, and compliance assurance process (CAP) program as well as measures designed to streamline 
audit and appeals process). 
283 “Korb Discusses ‘Coming Revolution’ in Large Corporate Exams,” 2006 TNT 16-23, at Pt. E.6 (Jan. 24, 
2006). 
284 See id. at 76-77 (explaining that the IRS has invited taxpayers with “a history of honest dealings” to 
participate and CAP and anticipating that participation in CAP will eventually be recognized as a badge of 
quality and integrity). 
285 See Nolan, supra note 112, at 28 (describing Memorandum of Understanding between IRS and 
taxpayer). 
286 Telephone Interview with Deborah M. Nolan, supra note 262. 
287 See “Korb Hails Dispute Resolution, Electronic Filing as Future of IRS,” 2005 TNT 236-3 (Dec. 8, 
2005) (describing IRS hopes for CAP program). 
288 Announcement 2005-87, 2005-50 I.R.B. 1144. 
289 See id. (stating that the IRS will accept a tax return consistent with CAP resolutions). 
290 See Nolan, supra note 112, at 28 (noting that the IRS development of CAP emerged from an 
examination of “ways to leverage the increased corporate governance and SEC reporting requirements 
occasioned by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
291 See Nolan, supra note 112, at 31 (stating that the CAP program produced 13 issue resolution 
agreements, 11 in-process issue resolution agreements, and one Full Acceptance Letter in its first pilot 
year). 
292 Telephone Interview With Deborah Nolan, supra note 262. 
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The tax shelter approach is a stick.  Government commenters express their anger at 
participants in tax shelters and their determination to exact penalties.293 
Despite this difference, the tax shelter story and the CAP story belong in the same 
organizational behavior book.  In the tax shelter case, the existence of a larger, more 
transparent tax decisionmaking group amplified the consistent, clear message of the tax 
shelter regulations and contemporaneous tax and securities enforcement efforts, such that 
all those involved focused on compliance, at least in the tax shelter area.  The CAP 
program more explicitly targets this decisionmaking group by seeking to get the IRS 
invited to its table, before the tax return is filed.  But both approaches leverage the larger 
and more transparent post-Sarbanes-Oxley tax decisionmaking group.  While the tax 
shelter example provides a regulatory model, in tax and other areas, for deviant 
transactions susceptible to rules and deviant taxpayers responsive to enforcement, the 
CAP example provides a regulatory model for grey-area transactions susceptible to 
standards and good-faith taxpayers responsive to cooperative regulatory efforts. 
 
B. How to Address Norm Cyclicality. 
 
1. A Permanent Anti-Tax Shelter Norm? 
 
On the evidence we now have, there is little reason to expect a permanent current 
uptick in corporate tax compliance, even with respect to the relatively narrow issue of tax 
shelters.  Commentators have previously observed a historical cycle of fraud, crackdown, 
compliance, a shift of focus from enforcement to service, and then more fraud.294 The 
observed recent increase in compliance with respect to tax shelters may simply represent 
the “crackdown” portion of the cycle.295 In addition, the listed transaction rules will no 
longer deter tax shelter participation if they fail to seek out and list new promoted 
transactions.  Enforcement and rule currency are two important elements of maintaining 
the current tax shelter compliance norm. 
 
293 See, e.g., Statement of Eileen J. O’Connor, supra note 127 (“The Division also prosecutes persons who 
promote or use fraudulent tax shelters and other schemes to evade taxes and hide assets.”). 
294 See Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves:  A Citizen’s Guide to the Debate Over Taxes 183-85 
(3d ed. 2004) (noting provisions in 1998 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act that 
imposed new requirements on IRS in response to popular perception that IRS often acted unfairly or 
unethically, and also noting increase in IRS customer service efforts, apparently at the expense of  
enforcement); Bryan T. Camp, “Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift 
in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,” 56 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 79 (2004) (noting debate over 
“‘pendulum’” swings between service and enforcement at the IRS in the wake of the 1998 Act). See also
William K. Black, The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One 247-48, 263 (2005) (noting the importance 
of studying and understanding fraud mechanisms, including waves of fraud, and pointing out the 
importance of norms as potential fraud restraints). 
295 Interview of former IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti by Frontline, posted Feb. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/shelter/return.html (“[I] think this thing is going to
rebound, especially as the economy improves.”); Interview of Pamela Olson by Frontline, supra note 243
(“I think what the IRS clearly has to do is to remain vigilant in this area. Because I think that if they let
down their guard there is at least some risk that we will see a return to this kind of activity.”).
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Part III of this Article attributes the increased interest in compliance to top 
executives’ and tax specialists’ fear of enforcement action.  Without continued reminders 
of the government’s view and determination to enforce it, compliance programs that look 
good on paper can falter as effective regulatory tools, as regulated parties respond to a 
reduced economic incentive to comply, perceive that other taxpayers may not comply, 
and interpret uncertain areas of the law to further their own self-interest.296  The 
government appears to be well aware of this risk.  Treasury and the IRS, together with 
federal prosecutors, have clearly prioritized enforcement.297 They must continue to do 
so. 
 
Of course, the government cannot control the success of its enforcement program. 
It faces considerable litigation hazards.  The use of the Thompson memo to turn 
employers against employees, the criminal fraud and conspiracy theory of the KPMG tax 
shelter case, and the alleged invalidity of various tax products may not stand up in court. 
The perceived violation of KPMG personnel’s constitutional rights in connection with the 
pending criminal case,298 for example, could generate an anti-government outcry similar 
to the perception of unethical IRS behavior that prompted the 1998 Act.  In addition, 
continued enforcement efforts aimed at senior corporate executives often fall outside the 
tax context and beyond the jurisdiction of Treasury, the IRS, or the Tax Division of the 
Justice Department. 
 
With respect to rule currency, IRS and Treasury should treat the tax shelter 
regulations as a living document.  The Office of Tax Shelter Analysis provides a good 
institutional forum to filter suggestions for additional listed transactions.  In addition, the 
government’s attention to new regulatory strategies such as the possible listing of “yellow 
light” transactions,299 its conscious keeping of lists of areas of compliance concern,300 its 
consideration of issues such as the proper treatment of patented transactions301 and its 
apparently close examination of the new, more detailed schedules M-3 showing corporate 
book and tax differences302 all indicate that the government devotes considerable energy 
to keeping these rules current.   
 
296 See Slemrod & Bajika, supra note 294, at 185 (describing economic incentive and perception of wider 
noncompliance risks of enforcement decline following 1998 Act); Eustice, supra note 205, 55 Tax L. Rev. 
at 160-62 (writing that “meaningful” audits should be government’s top priority); Bernard Wolfman, “Now 
Is Not the Time for Enforcement to Ease Up,” 109 Tax Notes 1105 (Nov. 21, 2005) (urging continued 
commitment of government resources to enforcement). See also Krawiec, supra note 37, at 528-34 (arguing 
that legal compliance professionals and regulated business organizations interpret incomplete law to further 
their own self-interest). 
297 See, e.g., “Everson Says IRS Could Collect up to $100 Billion More Per Year,” 2006 TNT 32-1 (Feb. 
15, 2006) (reporting IRS commissioner comment that IRS enforcement efforts have already significantly 
narrowed tax gap and request for additional enforcement funding). 
298 See supra TAN 147 - 148. 
299 Telephone Interview With Deborah Nolan, supra note 262. 
300 See, e.g., “Written Testimony of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson, supra note 260, at 
5-10 (listing areas of compliance concern. 
301 See supra note 258 (citing Congressional hearing on patented transactions). 
302 See Crystal Tandon, “More Than 200 Returns Targeted on Basis of Schedule M-3 Data,” 2006 TNT 
133-4 (July 11, 2006) (reporting on IRS use of M-3 data). 
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Enforcement strength and rule currency feed into the tax decisionmaking groups 
to foster a tax shelter compliance norm.  Without them, the current norm may be 
expected to falter.  The dependence of the current norm on continued enforcement and 
rule clarity follows in part from the deviant nature of the transactions targeted.  There is 
no assumption, in other words, that the targets of tax shelter regulation have internalized 
a lasting social norm of compliance. 
 
2. Making a Broader Tax Compliance Norm Permanent. 
 
Part V.A.3 above suggests that broadening a tax compliance norm into grey areas 
will benefit from a cooperative approach, like the IRS takes in its early-issue-resolution 
initiatives such as CAP.  Such initiatives attempt to use cooperative and frank discussion, 
not enforcement and clear rules, to encourage compliance.  They assume a population of 
good-faith taxpayers, not deviant tax avoiders.   
 
The above discussion in Part V.B.1 argued that the continuation of a tax shelter 
compliance norm depended on continued enforcement and rule clarity for effective 
policing of deviant taxpayers.  What determines whether a compliance norm emerging 
from CAP and similar programs will survive? 
 
As with the tax shelter regulations, the cooperative initiatives will continue to 
have effect only if their elements are maintained.  These initiatives, however, use 
different tools than the tax shelter regulations.  In addition to relying on enforcement of 
penalties against deviant taxpayers, as in the shelter area, they depend on the 
development of a responsible and responsive relationship between IRS personnel and the 
taxpayer.  IRS personnel must do their part to build and maintain such good-government 
relationships. 
 
In addition, perhaps CAP has the capacity to foster a stronger tax compliance 
norm internalized into the large corporation’s de facto ethical code, as well as a stronger 
cooperation norm from the government’s point of view.303 Such internalized social 
norms might not withstand an extended or egregious breach of trust, but they could help 
sustain a compliance pattern through lesser difficulties.  Cliff Jernigan, a seasoned tax 
director and tax practitioner who served as a senior member of the LMSB IRS team when 
CAP was adopted, writes: 
 
I predict that CAP will become the favored filing process by large 
companies.  Quality taxpayers will want to tell others in their industry that 
they are viewed as good taxpayers by using the CAP process.  Company 
CEOs will want their companies in the CAP program because it, like the 
Malcolm Baldridge Quality Award, will signify a quality company known 
for its honesty and fair dealing.304 
303 See supra TAN 25-29 (discussing legal and social norms). 
304 Jernigan, supra note 282, at 77. 
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Perhaps CAP participation will come to provide a clear and visible signal of 
honesty, encouraging others (such as prospective business partners and employees) to 
deal with CAP corporations.305 Perhaps such positive feedback will foster the 
internalization of a corporation tax compliance norm, under which individuals within a 
corporation feel pride in tax compliance and guilt as a result of noncompliance.306 
Theories relating to development of internalized social norms within organizations tie 
into individual psychology307 as well as large-organization behavioral theory308 and a full 
examination of them is beyond the scope of this Article.  Here, it means simply to suggest 
that the CAP program may open the door to the development of a tax compliance norm 
that is inherently stronger and more lasting than the current narrow tax shelter 
compliance norm.  Time will tell if it succeeds. 
C. Is the Norm Worth the Cost? 
A complete cost-benefit analysis of the observed tax compliance norm is beyond 
the scope of this Article.309 Nevertheless, this section offers several preliminary 
observations and attempts to suggest the complexity of the exercise. 
 
There are at least seven significant elements:  the benefit of additional tax 
revenues; the benefit of deterring other undesirable transactions that taxpayers declined to 
enter into due to concern about adverse tax outcomes; the cost of deterring valid tax 
planning; the cost of deterring frank attorney-client consultation as a result of the erosion 
of the attorney-client privilege; the cost of additional monitoring under Sarbanes-Oxley, 
including external Section 404 audits and independent board committees; the cost of tax 
and securities enforcement; and the cost of researching and drafting new rules.  The CAP 
program and similar initiatives involve additional commitments of government resources, 
including significant IRS personnel time. 
 
Each of these elements presents its own estimation challenges.  For example, the 
payment of taxes to the government represents not an increase in economic activity, but 
 
305 See Eric Posner, “Law and Social Norms:  The Case of Tax Compliance,” 86 Va. L. Rev. 1781, 1794-95 
(2000) (describing tax compliance norm signaling theory). 
306 See Robert D. Cooter, “Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy:  The Structural Approach to 
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant,” 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1664 (1996) (describing characteristics of 
an internalized norm). 
307 See id. at 1661–62 (discussing moral reasoning and emotional response as avenues for the 
internalization of norms). 
308 See supra Part I. 
309 The IRS does not typically engage in the cost-benefit analysis required of some other agencies under 
Executive Order 12886, typically taking the position that the rulemaking is not a “significant regulatory 
action,” meaning, among other things, that it will not have an annual economic effect of $100 million or 
more.  See Executive Order 12886, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (defining “significant regulatory 
action”; see, e.g., T.D. 9165, __ Fed. Reg. ___ (Dec. 8, 2004) (concluding that finalized Circular 230 
regulations were not a significant regulatory action).  Cf. Edward Sherwin “The Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Financial Regulation: What the SEC Ignores in the Rulemaking Process, Why It Matters, and What to Do 
About It,” Dec. 19, 2005 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (arguing that the SEC should 
conduct cost-benefit analysis like many other U.S. agencies and like its UK financial regulatory 
counterpart). 
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rather a transfer that hopefully promotes a more efficient and equitable tax system.310 
Enforcement has the capacity to emphasize that deviant taxpayers, while unusual, are 
firmly dealt with (which would be expected to increase other taxpayers’ compliance)  or 
to suggest that noncompliance is widespread (which would be expected to decrease other 
taxpayers’ compliance).311 Commentators also debate the importance of “good” tax 
planning, differing on the key question of the extent to which such planning guides 
taxpayers away from traps in the law that would result in taxpayer-adverse results 
contrary to legislative intent.312 
Measuring the cost of Sarbanes-Oxley, rulemaking and enforcement is a daunting 
and inexact task.  Moreover, only a portion of the Sarbanes-Oxley and enforcement costs 
should be attributed to tax compliance efforts. It is also possible that a less expensive 
form of, for example, Section 404 could support an equally effective expanded and 
transparent tax decisionmaking group.  Next, some evidence challenges the traditional 
assumption that erosion of the attorney-client privilege deters frank attorney-client 
conversations.313 Finally, the net cost of the CAP program and similar programs is likely 
to be known only after it has run for a number of years, since the benefit of avoiding later 
tax audit-related costs will offset the initial investment in the program. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Regulators of large corporations and other organizations can profitably use the 
organizational behavior insights offered by this Article.  The Article observes three 
factors that contribute to a currently observed anti-tax shelter compliance norm at large 
corporations:  an expanded and more transparent decisionmaking group, enforcement and 
publicity efforts directed at every member of that group, and clear rules.   These three 
factors provide a blueprint for the deterrence of clearly deviant transactions.   
 
Less obviously, the tax shelter story offers the more general lesson that attention 
to of the behavioral dynamics of decisionmaking groups can strengthen regulatory 
 
310 See Slemrod & Bajika, supra note 294, at 183 (noting that increased tax revenue does not represent 
increased economic activity). 
311 See Kahan, supra note 263, at 83 (noting empirical evidence that widely publicized enforcement 
campaigns decrease compliance, but acknowledging that punishment of deviant taxpayers is necessary to 
shore up any social norm of compliance for others); Posner, supra note 305, at 1790-91 (positing that 
increasing enforcement can weaken the value of the compliance signal for those who comply with the law 
although it will encourage compliance for those who evaluate the compliance decision on an economic 
basis rather than a social norm signaling basis). 
312 Compare Daniel N. Shaviro, “Evaluating the Social Costs of Corporate Tax Shelters,” 55 Tax L. Re. 
445, 450-51 (2002) (arguing that resources are overallocated to tax planning) and Weisbach, supra note 
204, at 222-25 (asserting that tax planning is a negative externality although acknowledging that planning 
to avoid taxpayer-adverse mistakes in the law may have value) with Hariton, supra note 225, at 400 
(suggesting that the anti-tax-shelter agenda should not target “tax-motivated structuring of legitimate 
business transactions) and Schler, supra note 6 (“If . . .Weisbach really means that his objection does not 
apply to taxpayers who take advantage of [Congressionally intended] tax incentives . . . the exceptions 
clearly swallow the rule.”).  
313 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 4, at 663-64 (labeling the traditional argument unpersuasive).   
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efforts.  In grey areas, where regulated parties may be acting in good faith and/or where 
broad regulatory standards, rather than clear rules, are appropriate, behaviorally sensitive 
regulation may involve government efforts to directly participate in such decisionmaking 
groups, as with the IRS CAP program.  The experience of these two different approaches 
to influencing tax decisions within large corporations can inform and assist regulators in 
nontax areas as well. 
 
